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SUBJECTIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION*

Harry P. Warnert
''When I have before me a case on review from the Interstate
Commerce Commission, almost instinctively I want to sustain their
order. When I have before me a case to review of the Federal
Trade Commission, almost instinctively I want to reverse it." 1

T

HE basis for judicial review of administrative agencies in one
form or another is the Union Pacific rule, originally developed to
govern the relationship between the courts and the Interstate Commerce Commission. 2 Variations in the application of this judicial
formula to different agencies 8 have been shaped for the most part by
the character of the governmental power exercised and the nature of

*

The writer acknowledges his indebtedness to Bernard M. Margolius, Paul M.
Segal and Stanley I. Posner, all of the District of Columbia bar, for their aid in the
preparation of this paper. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of
the writer.
Member of the District of Columbia bar; A.B., LL.B., Michigan.-Ed.
1 Professor, now Justice, Frankfurter, "Summation of Cincinnati Conference on
Administrative Tribunals," 24 A. B. A. J. 282 at 285 (1938), quoting Judge Hough
of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
2 lnterstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific Railroad, 222 U. S. 541 at
547, 32 S. Ct. 108 (1912): "That the orders of the Commission are final unless (1)
beyond the power which it could constitutionally exercise; or (2) beyond its statutory
power; or (3) based upon a mistake of law. But questions of fact may be involved
in the determination of questions of law, so that an order, regular on its face, may be
set aside if it appears that (4) ••• to be confiscatory and in violation of the constitutional prohibition against taking property without due process of law; or (5) if the
Commission acted so arbitrarily and unjustly ••• contrary to the evidence, or without
evidence to support it; or (6) if the authority therein involved has been exercised in
such an unreasonable manner as to cause it to be within the elementary rule that the
substance, and not the shadow, determines the validity of the exercise of the power."
This rule was foreshadowed in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois Cent. R. R.,
215 U.S. 452 at 470, 30 S. Ct. 155 (1910). Cf. Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United
States, 307 U. S. 125 at 140, 59 S. Ct. 754 (1939): "Only questions affecting constitutional power, statutory authority and the basic prerequisites of proof can be raised.
If these legal Jests are satisfied, the Commission's order becomes incontestable."
8 E.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U. S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615 (1937); Electric Bond & Share Co. v. Securities & Exchange
Comm., 303 U. S. 419, 58 S. Ct. 678 (1938); Federal Trade Comm. v. Curtis
Publishing Co., 260 U. S. 568, 43 S. Ct. 210 (1923); Old Colony Trust Co.
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 279 U. S. 716, 49 S. Ct. 499 (1929); Lloyd
Sabaudo Societa Anonima Per Azioni v. Elting, 287 U. S. 329, 53 S. Ct. 167 (1932).
Compare Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 52 S. Ct. 285 (1932).
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the subject matter under review.4 For example, the judicial control
exercised over taxing authorities is circumscribed by the sovereign demand for revenue essential to the maintenance of government. 5 The
scope of judicial review has been extended in deportation cases because
of a strong disposition to right the wrongs committed by a poorlymanned administrative agency employing an inadequate procedure.6
In some instances the flexible review may be ascribed to the expertness, or lack thereof, possessed by the agency; or it may be predicated on the "reputation of the agency for fairness and thoroughness."
"If the extent of judicial review is being shaped, as I believe,
by reference to an appreciation of the qualities of expertness for
decision that the administrative may possess, important consequences follow. The constitution of the administrative and the
procedure employed by it become of great importance. That these
factors already in part mould the scope of judicial review is
apparent from the decisions. Different agencies receive different
treatment from the courts. A reputation for fairness and thoroughness that attaches to a particular agency seeps through to the
judges and affects them in their treatment of its decisions. Fairness and thoroughness may also be apparent upon the record as
it reaches the court, so as to lead the court to the conclusion that
the evidence has received the attention that it deserved and that
it would have received •in the hands of one trained in legal techniques." 7
~ Albertsworth, "Judicial Review of Administrative Action by the Federal Supreme
Court," 35 HARV. L. REv. 127 (1921); Davis, "To What Extent Should the Decisions of Administrative Bodies be Reviewable by the Courts?" 25 A. B. A. J. 770 at
777 (1939).
5 Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S. 79, 24 S. Ct. 390 (1904); Loan Assn. v. Topeka,
20 Wall. (87 U. S.) 655 (1874); Powell, "Conclusiveness of Administrative Determinations in the Federal Government," I AM. PoL. Sci. REV. 583 at 589 (1907);
"Report of Committee on Federal Taxation," 62 A. B. A. REP. 679 at 685 (1937).
G Compare United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 25 S. Ct. 644 (1908), characterized by LAsK1, AUTHORITY IN THE MoDERN STATE 99 (1919), as the origin of
American administrative law, with Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U. S. 1, 24 S. Ct.
177 (1903); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 42 S. Ct. 492 (1922); VAN
VLECK, THE ADMINISTRATIVE CoNTROL OF ALIENS 27-32 (1932); Oppenheimer,
"Recent Developments in the Deportation Process," 36 M1cH. L. REV. 355 (1938).
7 Landis, "Administrative Policies and the Courts," 47 YALE L. J. 519 at 531
(1938); Davis, "To What Extent Should the Decisions of Administrative Bodies be
Reviewable by the Courts?" 25 A. B. A. J. 770 at 774 (1939):
"The custom of judicial decorum inhibiting frank discussion in formal opinions
of calibre of individuals who man our various agencies, and the resulting habit of writing
judicial opinions largely in terms of theoretical conceptions, are by no means proof that
existing practices have not been molded largely by pragmatic considerations. Discerning
judges will always strain to nullify unfairness caused by lack of administrative thorough-
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The foregoing quotation exemplifies the subjective aspect of judicial review-in reality, an attitude or state of mind of the courts.
Ordinarily, if any application of this "judicial attitude" be attempted,
it refers to the Interstate Commerce Commission as an agency which
has won a very high degree of both public and judicial respect. 8 The
Federal Trade Commission has not fared as well. The commission's
early procedure-the combination of prosecutor and judge, and failure to publish findings-resulted in a public and judicial distrust of its
administrative process. 0
It is the purpose of this paper to examine the leading decisions
i~volving the Federal Communications Commission and its predecessor,
the Federal Radio Commission, paralleled by an exposition of the
administrative activities of the commission wherever the latter is
deemed necessary. Has there been a change in the judicial attitude of
the reviewing court towards the agency under observation? What are
the factors which have caused this changed judicial attitude?
There are several factors which make this study of the Federal
Communications Commission more interesting and edifying than a
broad horizontal examination of what is here titled subjective judicial
review. In the first place, we are working within the framework of a
single statute, and variations in decisions need not be distinguished or
reconciled on the basis of statutory differenees in language. Secondly,
there is available for study a substantial number of decisions, all from
the same court, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The judges have become familiar .with the statute
and the subject matter, and, because of physical location, more readily
ness or competency. Neither the narrow scope of judicial review of Interstate Commerce Commission orders nor continual disregard of Federal Trade Commission findings
can be explained by theories about supremacy of law, separation of powers, and the
law-fact distinction."
At the Administrative Law Institute conducted by the George Washington
University of Law in January, 1939, in Washington, D. C., Carl McFarland, a member of the panel, emphasized the importance of the "judicial attitude" in reviewing
administrative determinations. Compare, McFARLAND, JumcIAL CoNTROL OF THE
FEDERAL TRADE CoMMISSION AND THE INTERSTATE CoMMERCE CoMMISSION 33,

176-177 (1933).
8 2 SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE CoMMERCE CoMMISSION 423-424 (1931);
Tollefson, "Judicial Review of the Decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission,"
5 GEo, WASH. L. REv. 503 (1937); Chief Justice Hughes, "Address before the
American Law Institute," 24 A. B. A. J. 431 at 432 (1938): "Administrative agencies
'informed by experience,' and which have shown their capacity for dealing expertly
with intricate problems, as, for example, in the case of the Interstate Commerce Commission, have won a very high degree of public respect."
9 HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE CoMM1ss10N, c. 2, 3 (1924); LANms, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 105-106 (1938).

1940]

COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW

aware than would otherwise be possible of the administrative activities
of the commission.10
THE PERIOD oF RESTRICTED REvrnw-1927-1937
The first general law on the subject of radio communication was
the 1912 act, entitled "An Act to Regulate Radio Communication." 11
This statute, which vested jurisdiction over radio communication in the
secretary of commerce, contained no provision for appellate review.
The basic defect of the 1912 act, namely the failure of Congress to
provide any discretionary standard for the secretary of commerce in the
issuance of licenses, soon resulted in the application by the Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia of the extraordinary legal writ of
mandamus to require the secretary to grant licenses to all applicants.12
The affirmance of this decision by the appellate court 18 paved the way
for an opinion by the attorney general which in substance held that the
1912 act conferred no general authority on the secretary of commerce
to fix hours of operation or limit power, and that it "preclude [ d] the
possibility of administrative discretion in [this] field." 14 This produced chaos in the radio broadcasting industry with the resultant breakdown of the law.111
The Radio Act of 192 7 16 was enacted for the purpose of correcting
the apparent deficiencies in the 1912 act. Popular demand for some
sort of judicial review resulted in the inclusion of an appellate clause
in the statute.11
10 Both the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the
Federal Communications Commission are located in Washington, D.C. The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has ~exclusive jurisdiction over
broadcast matters except in revocation proceedings, which may be brought in the federal
district courts under the Urgent Deficiencies Act. 38 Stat. L. 219 (1913), incorporated
in 48 Stat. L. 1093 (1934), 47 U.S. C. (1934), § 402(a).
11 37 Stat. L. 302 (1912). For a general discussion of the 1912 act, see DAVIS,
THE LAw OF RADIO CoMMUNICATION, c. 4 (1927).
12 Intercity Radio Company v. Hoover, decided November 23, 1921, unreported.
The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia is now the District Court of the
United States for the District of Columbia.
18 Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 52 App. D. C. 339, 286 F. 1003 (1923),
error dismissed by stipulation, 266 U. S. 636, 45 S. Ct. IO (1924); Donovan,
«Origin and Development of Radio Law," 2 AIR L. REV. 107, 349, 468 (1931).
Compare United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., (D. C. Ill. 1926) 12 F. (2d) 614,
with Carmichael v. Anderson, (D. C. Mo. 1926) 14 F. (2d) 166.
14 35 OPs. Arn. GEN. 126 at 129 (1926).
15 DAVIS, LAw OF RAmo CoMMUNICATION 54 (1927).
16 Act of February 23, 1927, 44 Stat. L. II62-u74.
17 H. REP. 404, 69th Cong., 1st sess., p. 19 (1926): "During the consideration
of legislation upon radio there has been a general demand that a right of appeal •••
should be accorded aggrieved parties; and the Secretary of Commerce and the Solicitor
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Section r6 of the r927 act provided in part:
"Any applicant for a construction permit, for a station license,
or for the renewal or modification of an existing license whose
application is refused by the licensing authority shall have the
right to appeal from said decision to the Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia....
"At the earliest convenient time, the court shall hear, review
and determine the appeal upon said record and evidence, and may
alter or revise the decision appealed from and enter such judgment
as to it may seem just. The revision by the court shall be confined
to the points set forth in the reasons of appeal."
The judicial interpretation and scope of appellate jurisdiction under
this provision were first raised in Federal Radio Commission v. General
Electric Co.18 Since r923, WGY, owned by the General Electric Company, had been assigned to the 790-kilocycle frequency, sharing time
with station WHAZ. On October r2, r928, the commission authorized
a revision of the allocation of all broadcasting stations, effective on
November II, r928. By the terms of this revision, WGY was assigned
its same frequency of 790 kilocycles with a power of 50,000 watts subj ect to limitation that the station was to share the frequency with station
KGO, Oakland, California, and was not to operate after sunset at the
latter station. The effect of the commission's action was to deprive
WGY of variable evening hours of operation. WGY appealed and the
court reversed and remanded the case to the commission with instructions that WGY be authorized to operate in the evening without any
time limitations.19 The commission applied for certiorari. 20 The
Supreme Court declined to take jurisdiction, holding that the "provision for appeals to the Court of Appeals does no more than make
that court a superior and revising agency in the same field," 21 and that
of the Department of Commerce likewise took the position that such appeal should
be granted." This report accompanied H. R. 9108, later merged into H. R. 9971,
which ultimately became the Radio Act of 1927.
18 281 U. S. 464, 50 S. Ct. 389 (1930).
19 General Electric Co. v. Federal Radio Comm., 58 App. D. C. 386, 31 F. (2d)
630 (1929).
20 The commission, contemporaneous with its application for certiorari, filed an
original application for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition. The latter was consolidated and set down for hearing with the petition for writ
of certiorari. The opinion of the Supreme Court in 281 U. S. 464, 50 S. Ct. 389,
d~es not mention the petitions for mandamus and/or prohibition. In all probability
the latter were dismissed.
21 Federal Radio Comm. v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464 at 467, 50 S. Ct.
3_89 (1930).
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the court of appeals was a part of the machinery of the Radio Commission for administrative purposes. The Supreme Court was precluded from exercising its jurisdiction on decisions which call for the
exercise of essentially legislative or administrative functions.
The judicial interpretation given to section I 6 of the Radio Act
of I 92 7 made the court of appeals the final reviewing tribunal. In view
of the broad language contained in section I 6, the court was at liberty
to exercise its independent judgment on the law and the facts, revise
any decision, or substitute its own judgment for that of the commission.
The court, for the most part, exercised a restricted judicial supervision
and held that it "should sustain the Commission's findings unless they
are shown by the record to be manifestly against the evidence." 22 It was
soon established that any order of the commission changing a station's
frequency without notice or opportunity for hearing was void,23 and
that an ex parte proceeding resulting in findings and conclusions, formulated in the absence of the applicant and based on undisclosed evidence, was error of law.24 It was likewise held that the commission
could depart from the strict jury-trial rules of evidence which are applicable in court proceedings. 25
The court of appeals exercised its appellate jurisdiction in thirteen
cases 26 under section I 6 of the I 92 7 act. The commission was reversed
in six cases. Three of the reversals were caused by the failure of the
commission to accord appellants notice and hearing where changes in
frequencies were involved. 21 The reversal in the Richmond Development Corporation case can be attributed to an erroneous interpretation
by the commission of section 2I of the act. 28 In the Great Lakes Broad22
Technical Radio Laboratory v. Federal Radio Comm., 59 App. D. C. 125
at 128, 36 F. (2d) II 1 (1929); Havens & Martin, Inc. v. Federal Radio Comm.,
59 App. D. C. 393, 45 F. (2d) 295 (1930); Ansley v. Federal Radio Comm., 60
App. D. C. 19, 46 F. (2d) 600 (1930); Marquette University v. Federal Radio
Comm., 60 App. D. C. 44, 47 F. (2d) 406 (1931); Reading Broadcasting Co. v.
Federal Radio Comm., 60 App. D. C. 89, 48 F. (2d) 458 (1931).
28
Saltzman v. Stromberg-Carlson Telephone Mfg. Co., 60 App. D. C. 31, 46
F. (2d) 612 (1931); Courier-Journal Co. v. Federal Radio Comm., 60 App. D. C.
33, 46 F. (2d) 614 (1931); Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Federal Radio
Comm., 60 App. D. C. 53, 47 F. (2d) 415 (1931).
24
Saltzman v. Stromberg-Carlson Telephone Mfg. Co., 60 App. D. C. 31, 46
F. {2d) 612 (1931).
25
Technical· Radio Laboratory v. Federal Radio Comm., 59 App. D. C. 125,
36 F. (2d) 111 (1929).
26
Throughout this article, cases have reference to written opinions. In several
instances, one written opinion may consider two or more appeals.
27
Cases cited in note 23, supra.
28
Richmond Development Corp. v. Federal Radio Comm., 59 App. D. C. 113,
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casting Company case,29 the court, as in the General Electric case, revised the judgment of the commission. The latter two cases are the only
instances wherein the court substituted its judgment for the commission's. _In those cases where the commission was sustained,so the court
recognized the commission's expertness and competence in handling a
highly technical problem. 81
The desire to insure judicial review of the commission's activities
by the Supreme Court 82 provoked the 1930 amendment to the Radio
Act, which supplanted in toto the former provision for review. Section
16 was amended to provide that:
"(a) An appeal may be taken •.. from decisions of the commission to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in any
of the following cases:
. "( 1) By any applicant for a station license, or for renewal of
an existing station license, or for modification of an existing station
license, whose application is refused by the commission.
" ( 2) By any licensee whose license is revoked, modified, or
suspended by the commission.
I

35 F. (2d) 883 (1929). Section 21 provides in part that before a license shall be
issued for the operation of a station, the construction of which is begun or continued
after the act takes effect, an applicant must secure a permit for its construction from
the commission. The permit will be automatically forfeited if the station is not ready
for operation within the time specified or within such further time as the licensing
authority may allow, unless prevented by causes not under the control of the grantee.
Appellant had been authorized to construct a new station on May 2, 1928.
Appellant requested several extensions of time, the last one on September 15, 1928,
to expire October 31, 1928, in order to complete the construction of the station. The
uncontradicted evidence is to the effect that during this time appellant was making
diligent effort to complete the station within the specified time, but owing to delays
caused by contractors, by engineering difficulties and by weather conditions, construction was not completed by September. The Commission denied appellant's last petition
for extension of time, which had the effect of revoking the construction permit. The
court ruled that "the evidence without substantial contradiction, discloses that the
applicant had acted, not only in good faith, but also with diligence, in its efforts to
construct the station within the time allowed by the permit, and that the completion
thereof was prevented by causes not under its control." 59 App. D. C. at 114.
29 Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Radio Comm., 59 App. D. C. 197,
37 F. (2d) 993 (1930).
so In addition to the five cases cited in note 22, supra, the commission was sustained in the City of New York v. Federal Radio Comm., 59 App. D. C. 129, 36 F.
(2d) II5 (1929), and Carrell v. Federal Radio Comm., 59 App. D. C. 131, 36 F.
(2d) 117 (1929).
81 E.g., Ansley v. Federal Radio Comm., 60 App. D. C. 19 at 20, 46 F. (2d)
600 (1930); Havens & Martin, Inc. v. Federal Radio Comm., 59 App. D. C. 393,
45 F. (2d) 295 (1930).
82 See S. REP. uo5, 71St Cong., 2d sess. (1930), which accompanied H. R.
12599; 72 Cong. Rec. II882 (1930). See note 144, infra.
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"(3) By any other person, firm, or corporation aggrieved or
whose interests are adversely affected by any decision of the commission granting or refusing any such application or by any decision of the commission revoking, modifying or suspending an
existing station license. • •.
"(d) At the earliest convenient time, the court shall hear
and determine the appeal upon the record before it, and shall have
the power, upon such record, to enter a judgment affirming or
reversing the decision of the commission, and, in the event the
court shall render a decision and enter an order reversing the
decision of the commission, it shall remand the case to the commission to carry out the judgment of the court: Provided, however, That the review by the court shall be limited to questions
of law and that the findings of fact by the commsision, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive unless it shall
clearly appear that the findings of the commission are arbitrary or
capricious." 88
The foregoing provision was carried over, almost verbatim, into
section 402 of the Communications Act of 1934,34
The validity of the 1930 amendment to the Radio Act of 1927
was upheld by the Supreme Court in Federal Radio Commission v.
Nelson Brothers Bond & Mortgage Company. 85 It is a curious anomaly
that although one of the avowed purposes of the 1930 amendment
was to give jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, the latter has been extremely reluctant to grant applications for certiorari.86
In the Nelson Brothers Bond & Mortgage Company case, the
Supreme Court pointed out that the amendment to section 16 limited
review to "questions of law" and that this "limitation manifestly demands judicial, as distinguished from administrative, review." 37 The
extent of judicial review is thereby patterned after the rule of review
laid down in the Union Pacific case.
"Whether the Commission applies the legislative standards validly set up, whether it acts within the authority conferred or goes
beyond it, whether its proceedings satisfy the pertinent demands of
due process, whether, in short, there is compliance with the legal
83

Act of July 1, 1930, 46 Stat. L. 844.
Act of June 19, 1934, 48 Stat. L. I064 at 1093, 47 U.S. C. (1934), § 402,
85
289 U.S. 266, 53 S. Ct. 627 (1933).
86
From 1933 to the fall of 1939, the Supreme Court refused all applications for
certiorari filed by licensees of broadcast stations. At the present time the Supreme
Court has granted three applications for certiorari filed by the Commission.
87
289 U. S. 266 at 276.
84
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requirements which fix the province of the Commission and govern
its action, are appropriate questions for judicial decision. • .• Such
an examination is not concerned with the weight of evidence or
with the wisdom or expediency of the administrative action." 88
For six years, from I93I to December I937, when the Heitmeyer
case 89 was decided, the court of appeals exercised a minimum of judicial
supervision over the commission's activities. In this six year period, the
court rendered thirty-nine written opinions; the commission was reversed in only three cases. In the Journal Company 40 case the commission was reversed because its action in granting additional power to two
stations operating on the 620-kilocycle frequency was taken without
notice to the appellant, an existing licensee operating on the same frequency, with the result that appellant suffered "intolerable interference" from the commission's grant. Although the decision can be explained on procedural grounds, the case has several significant aspects.
The court held that an existing licensee who would suffer objectionable
electrical interference by the commission's grant, was a "person, firm,
or corporation aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected by
any decision of the commission." The court likewise declared that
"No station that has been operated in good faith should be subjected
to a change of frequency or power or to a reduction of its normal and
established service area, except for compelling reasons," and that the
commission's finding that appellant would not receive intolerable interference was "manifestly against the evidence." 41 This was the only
88 Ibid., 289 U. S. 266 at 276, 277. See also Missouri Broadcasting Corp. v.
Federal Communications Comm., 68 App. D. C. 154 at 156, 94 F. (2d) 623 (1937),
cert. denied 303 U. S. 65 5, 58 S. Ct. 759 (1938): "The review to this court is
limited by the act to questions of law, and it is provided that 'findings of fact by the
Commission, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive unless it shall
clearly appear that the findings of the Commission are arbitrary or capricious.' [48
Stat. L. 1093 (1934), 47 U. S. C. (1934), § 402 (e).] This quoted language of the
act provides substantially the same rnle applied in cases of appeal from most, if not all,
of the important federal administrative boards and commissions. The language implies
that there shall be a public hearing, that evidence shall be taken and preserved, that
the facts shall be found by the commission, and that this court shall have jurisdiction
to deny effect to an order made without any supporting evidence or contrary to the
indisputable character of the evidence, or wherever the hearing or the decision is inadequate, unfair, or arbitrary.'' The court cited Crowell v. Benson, 28 5 U. S. 22,
52 S. Ct. 285 (1932).
89 Heitmeyer v. Federal Communications Comm., 68 App. D. C. 180, 95 F.
(2d) 91 (1937).
40 Journal Co. v. Federal Radio Comm., 60 App. D. C. 92, 48 F. (2d) 461
(1931).
41 Ibid., at 93, 94.

1940]

CoMMUNICATIONS REVIEW

case in the six-year period wherein the court challenged the validity
of the commission's findings. It is interesting to note that the court
was reluctant to direct the particular form of relief, and ordered the
commission to work out an equitable solution of the problem.
The court reversed the commission in the Symons case 42 because
the commission had granted a construction permit to an applicant without giving a competing applicant for the same facilities an opportunity
to be heard. The commission in this case had made a temporary grant
of a construction permit for 900-kilocycles to the intervener, licensee of
KSEI, without a hearing. Paragraph 45 48 of the commission's rules
provided that where an application is granted in whole or in part without a hearing, any person or corporation aggrieved and whose interests
are adversely affected by such a temporary grant may obtain a hearing
before the commission by filing a protest within twenty days. Appellant
filed its protest within the prescribed period. The commission ignored
the protest and refused to grant a hearing and this "was arbitrary and
in violation of its rules." 44 The reversal in the Symons case can be
attributed to the commission's failure to grant appellant the procedural
rights of a hearing which had been guaranteed by the commission's
rules and regulations and on general principles of due process of law.
The court in its opinion enunciated the following dictum, namely that
where there is a controversy between two radio broadcasting stations,
the commission's action should not be based "on the mere question of
priority of application as between the two stations but rather on the
basic standard which Congress [has] directed shall apply, namely, the
public interest and convenience." 44a The foregoing statement is highly
significant. In so far as each case must be decided on its individual
merits, the dictum suggests the negative inference that the commission
need not crystallize policies nor standards in its administrative interpretation of the Radio Act.
The third case in which the commission was reversed was Unity
School of Christianity v. Federal Radio Commission.4 G The Radio Act
42 Symons Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Radio Comm., 62 App. D. C. 46, 64 F.
(2d) 381 (1933).
43 The new rules of practice and procedure adopted by the Federal Communications Commission on July 12, 1939, effective August 1, 1939, contain no applicable
provision which authorizes the filing of protests by applicants. 4 FED. REG. 33413355 (July 19, 1939).
44 Symons Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Radio Comm., 62 App. D. C. 46 at 47,
64 F. (2d) 381 (1933).
44
a Ibid., 62 App. D. C. at 46.
{G 62 App. D. C. 52, 64 F. (2d) 550 (1933).
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of I 92 7 contained no statutory provision which gave an applicant the
right of oral argument before the commission. In the Nelson Brothers
Bond & Mortgage case, the Supreme Court held that the absence of
oral argument on an examiner's report before the commission did not
invalidate an order when no request had been made for oral argument. 46 The court of appeals expanded this principle and ruled that the
commission in its discretion may properly refuse oral argument to an
applicant who had been served with an examiner's report and had had
opportunity to file exceptions thereto. 47 This principle was modified
in the Unity case. It was there held that where oral argument is accorded to a respondent, it was the commission's duty before decision
to notify appellant and afford the latter an opportunity to be heard.
The Communications Act of I934 removes the uncertainty attendant
oral argument in the Radio Act of I 92 7 by specifically providing that
in all cases heard by an examiner the commission shall hear oral argument on request or either party.48
These three reversals illustrate that the court of appeals restricted
its judicial supervision to the constitutional minimum of notice and
hearing; correspondingly, the commission exercised an extremely broad
administrative discretion in its interpretation of the act. This is confirmed by the cases wherein the court affirmed the commission. In r928
Congress enacted the so-called Davis amendment, which was to provide
a more equitable distribution of radio broadcasting facilities among
zones and among the several stat\:!S according to population.49 Pursuant
to this statutory mandate, the commission established a quota system
whereby the assignable radio broadcasting facilities were classified in
numerical units according to power, frequency, and hours of operation.
48 Compare Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906 (1936),
304 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999 (1938).
_ 41 Sproul v. Federal Radio Comm., 60 App. D. C. 333, 54 F. (2d) 444 (1931);
Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Assn. v. Federal Radio Comm., 62 App. D. C. 138,
65 F. (2d) 484 (1933).
48 48 Stat. L. 1096, 47 U. S. C. (1934), § 409 (a).
49 Act of March 28, 1928, 45 Stat. L. 373. The Davis amendment was carried
over into the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. L. 1084, 47 U. S. C. (1934),
§ 307 (b). It was repealed by the act of June 5, 1936, 49 Stat. L. 1475. Section 307
(b) now provides: "In considering applications for licenses, and modifications and
renewals thereof, when and insofar as there is a demand for the same, the Commission
shall make such distribution of licenses, frequencies, hours of operation and of power
among the several States and communities as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable
distribution of radio service to each of same." '49 Stat. L. 1475, 47 U. S. C. (Supp.
1938), § 307 (b).
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Quotas of facilities were established for the several states. 50 The regulation which established the quota system provided that where a zone
or state had its pro-rata or over-quota share of facilities, the commission
would not allocate any further radio facilities to that zone or state. It
was further provided that the commission could allow a slight departure, "plus or minus" in the allocation of broadcast facilities pursuant
to its quota system.51 The validity of the quota system was soon established and the commission's administrative interpretation of the Davis
amendment was upheld in every case. The court held that the commission's finding under the quota system "is presumed to be correct." G2
In the thirty-six written opinions handed down in this six-year
period, the court of appeals on innumerable occasions stated that the
findings of fact made by the commission, if supported by substantial
evidence, are conclusive unless it shall clearly appear that the findings
are arbitrary or capricious. 58 Substantial evidence was any evidence in
the record which tended to support the commission's findings and
conclusions. 5~
50 General Order No. 92 of the Federal Radio Commission, promulgated June
17, 1930, 4 F. R. C. ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1930).
51 General Order No. 102 of the Federal Radio Commission, promulgated January 8, 1931, 5 F. R. C. ANNUAL REPORT 91-92 (1931).
52 Ansley v. Federal Radio Comm., 60 App. D. C. 19 at 21, 46 F. (2d) 600
(1930). Accord: Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Federal Radio Comm., 60 App. D. C.
375, 55 F. (2d) 537 (1931); Pacific Development Radio Co. v. Federal Radio
Comm., 60 App. D. C. 378, 55 F. (2d) 540 (1931); Strawbridge & Clothier v.
Federal Radio Comm., 61 App. D. C. 68, 57 F. (2d) 434 (1932); WHB Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Radio Comm., 61 App. D. C. 14, 56 F (2d) 311 (1932); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., 64 App. D. C. 189, 76
F. (2d) 439 (1935); Radio Service Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm., 64
App. D. C. 323, 78 F. (2d) 207 (1935); Eastland Co. v. Federal Communications
Comm., 67 App. D. C. 316, 92 F. (2d) 467 (1937).
58
Cases cited supra, note 52; also Beebe v. Federal Radio Comm., 61 App. D. C.
273, 61 F. (2d) 914 (1932); Brahy v. Federal Radio Comm., 61 App. D. C. 204,
59 F. (2d) 879 (1932); Davidson v. Federal Radio Comm., 61 App. D. C. 249,
61 F. (2d) 401 (1932); Radio Inv. Co. v. Federal Radio Comm., 61 App. D. C.
296, 62 F. (2d) 381 (1932); Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Assn. v. Federal
Radio Comm., 61 App. D. C. 54, 57 F. (2d) 420 (1932); City of New York v.
Federal Radio Comm., 62 App. D. C. 81, 64 F. (2d) 719 (1933); Woodmen of
the World Life Ins. Assn. v. Federal Radio Comm., 62 App. D. C. 138, 65 F. (2d)
484 (1933); WREC v. Federal Radio Comm., 62 App. D. C. 312, 67 F. (2d) 578
(1933); Unity School of Christianity v. Federal Radio Comm., 63 App. D. C. 84,
69 F. (2d) 570 (1934); Don Lee Broadcasting System v. Federal Communications
Comm., 64 App. D. C. 228, 76 F. (2d) 998 (1935); Head-of-the-Lakes Broadcasting
Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., 66 App. D. C. 19, 84 F. (2d) 396 (1936).
I
H Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Assn. v. Federal Radio Comm., 62 App.
D. C. 138 at 139, 65 F. (2d) 484 (1933): ''While the evidence is conflicting, that
introduced in behalf of the applicant station certainly tended to support the conclu-
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During this six-year period, the commission's refusal to renew the
licenses of six stations was upheld by the court. The judicial tribunal
attached the same conclusiveness to the commission's findings in renewal
cases, which involved the deletion of existing stations, as it did to
appeals by applicants who requested construction permits or improvements in existing facilities. In four of the cases the court affirmed the
commission's findings of faulty and inefficient technical operation and
equipment. 55 In the other two cases, the court affirmed the commission's
factual determinations in deleting two stations whose program standards were inimical to the public interest. In both cases the commission
considered the character and quality of the program service; the court
held that administrative scrutiny of programs was not censorship and
that it did not violate the First Amendment to the Constitution. 56
Courts have always exercised a broader judicial supervision where
ethical or moral questions are involved. For example, in reviewing the
determinations of the Federal Trade Commission, the courts extended
the scope of judicial review because of the moral or ethical implications attached to "unfair competition." 57 The ethical problems are as
great or perhaps greater when the commission deletes a station because
the latter's programs violate the accepted standards of good taste.
Nevertheless the court has applied a uniform standard of finality to
ethical as compared to technical determinations.
The foregoing cases wherein stations have been deleted because of
improprieties in technical operation or program standards must be
sions reached by the examiner and the Commission. In other words, there was substantial evidence to support those findings and, hence, they are conclusive." See also
Eastland Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., 67 App. D. C. 316, 92· F. (2d)
467 (1937).
55 Riker v. Federal Radio Comm., 60 App. D. C. 373, 55 F. (2d) 535 (1931);
Brahy v. Federal Radio Comm., 61 App. D. C. 204, 59 F (2d) 879 (1932); Beebe
v. Federal Radio Comm., 61 App. D. C. 273, 61 F. (2d) 914 (1932). In Boston
Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Radio Comm., 62 App. D. C. 299, 67 F. (2d) 505
(1933), the primary ground for the commission's refusal to renew the license was the
insolvency of the applicant. A secondary finding by the commission was appellant's
failure to operate the technical equipment in conformity with the terms of the license.
56 KFKB Broadcasting Assn. Inc. v. Federal Radio Comm., 60 App. D. C. 79, 47
F. ( 2d) 670 ( l 93 l}; Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Comm., 61
App. D. C. 3II, 62 F. (2d) 850 (1932), cert. denied 288 U. S. 599, 53 S. Ct.
317 (1933). Cf. Kadin, "Administrative Censorship: A Study of the Mails, Monion
Pictures, and Radio Broadcasting," 19 BosT. UNiv. L. REv. 533 at 561 (1939).
57 Federal Trade Comm. v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 at 427, 40 S. Ct. 572 (1920);
McFARLAND, JumcIAL CoNTROL OF THE FEDERAL TRADE CoMMISSION AND THE
INTERSTATE CoMMERCE CoMMISSION 17, 181 (1933). See Hankin, "Conclusiveness of
the Federal Trade Commission's Findings as to Facts," 23 M1cH. L. REv. 233 (1925).
Cf. Federal Trade Comm. v. Keppel & Bro., 291 U. S. 304, 54 S. Ct. 423 (1934).
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distinguished from those decisions wherein an applicant requests the
facilities of an existing licensee. In the former instance the action of
the commission in charging an existing licensee with violations of the
statute and the regulations is a controversy between the commission
and the licensee. In the second case it is an adversary proceeding between the applicant requesting the facilities of an existing licensee and
that existing licensee, with the commission as judge in the interest of
the public. The applicant who requests the facilities of an existing
licensee must make a comparative showing and has the burden of proof
to show that he is better qualified and will render a superior public
service. The foregoing distinction has not been fully developed by the
court; it is reflected to some extent in the commission's administrative
process. 58 However, several judicial opinions recognize the equities of
existing licensees, particularly the large financial outlays which have
been invested. "The cause of· independent broadcasting in general
would be seriously endangered and public interests correspondingly
prejudiced, if the licenses of established stations should arbitrarily be
withdrawn from them, and appropriated to the use of other stations." 59
One of the most fascinating chapters in the administration of radio
broadcasting has been the commission's attitude toward economic factors in the allocation and distribution of broadcasting facilities. The
question whether or not the commission must consider the competitive
aspects of broadcasting and whether economic injury is a sufficient
basis for an appeal merits individual treatment in another article. We
shall set forth the high lights of this question only as it relates to the
activities of the court.
In the WGN case,60 appellant, licensee of radio broadcasting station
WGN, located in Chicago, Illinois, contended that the grant of addi58 Re Wilburn, 1 F. C. C. 146 (1934); Re Walker & Downing Radio Corp.,
1 F. C. C. 183 (1934); Re Parmer, 2 F. C. C. 172 (1935); Re Walker, 2 F. C. C.
489 (1936); Re Berks Broadcasting Co., 3 F. C. C. 54 (1936); Re Kindig, 3 F. C. C.
313 (1936); Re Wimpy, 4 F. C. C. 178 (1937).
59
Chicago Federation of Labor v. Federal Radio Comm., 59 App. D. C. 333
at 334, 41 F. (2d) 422 (1930). Accord: Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Assn. v.
Federal Radio Comm., 61 App. D. C. 54, 57 F. (2d) 420 (1932); Journal Co. v.
Federal Radio Comm., 60 App. D. C. 92, 48 F. (2d) 461 (1931); Don Lee Broadcasting System v. Federal Communications Comm., 64 App. D. C. 228, 76 F. (2d)
998 (1935). Cf. Federal Radio Comm. v. Nelson Brothers Bond & Mortgage Co., 289
U.S. 266, 53 S. Ct. 627 (1933). But compare Radio Investment Co. v. Federal Radio
Comm., 61 App. D. C. 296, 62 F. (2d) 381 (1932), and Unity School of Christianity
v. Federal Radio Comm., 63 App. D. C. 84, 69 F. (2d) 570 (1934).
60
WGN, Inc. v. Federal Radio Comm., 62 App. D. C. 385, 68 F. (2d) 432
(1933).
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tional facilities to the same community would increase competit10n
among broadcast stations in Chicago and thereby inflict a pecuniary loss
on WGN. The court ruled that the "complaint ... is so vague, problematical, and conjectural, as not to furnish a present substantial objection to the Commission's decision." 01
This statement caused a great deal of confusion in the administration of the Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications Act of 1934;
the commission was of the opinion that it need not consider economic
factors in the allocation of broadcast facilities. 02 In 1935, after the
Federal Communications Commission had been created, Station
WREN, located in the metropolitan area of Kansas City, Missouri,
petitioned the commission to intervene in the application of WHB
Broadcasting Company, which had requested evening hours of operation. 08 WREN claimed that the operation of WHB at night would
result in active competition with the former as to distribution of
audience listeners,. advertising revenue, and available talent material.
The commission denied WREN's petition for intervention. 04 Appellant
thereupon sought to enjoin the hearing on WHB's application until
it was a:fforded an opportunity to participate therein. The district court
denied the preliminary injunction and the commission's motion to
dismiss. The commission appealed, alleging, first, that an economic interest was not such an interest as ,entitled an existing licensee to intervene, and second, that WREN had a plain, speedy, and adequate remIbid., 62 App. D. C. at 386.
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., 64 App. D. C.
189, 76 F. (2d) 439 (1935); Head-of-the-Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., 66 App. D. C. 19, 84 F. (2d) 396 (1936). Commissioner Thad
H. Brown in an address entitled "The Federal Communications Law," delivered at
the School of Law, Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, on May 11, 1937
(Press Release 2 I 207, p. 3 I) expressed the opinion that the commission does not
consider the competitive aspects of radio broadcasting.
63 Sykes v. Jenny Wren Co., 64 App. D. C. 379, 78 F. (2d) 729 (1935), cert.
denied 296 U. S. 624, 56 S. Ct. 147 (1935).
64 Paragraph 59 of the Federal Radio Commission's and Federal Communication
Commission's Rules and Regulations, which were in effect until December 18, 1935,
provided: "Any governmental department or officer, any person, firm, company or
corporation, or any State or political subdivision thereof may, at any time, more than
ten days prior to the date of any hearing, file with the Commission a petition to intervene therein in support of or in opposition to any application designated for hearing.
If the petition discloses a substantial interest in the subject matter of the hearing the
Commission will grant the same and permit the petitioner to be heard at such hearing
_subject to regulations hereinafter imposed." Compare paragraph 1.102 on intervention
of the present Rules of Practice and Procedure, effective August 1, 1939, 4 FED. REG.
3344 (1939).
61
62
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edy at law under the appeals provision of the act. The court ruled that
the statutory remedy was exclusive and dismissed the bill. In a subsequent proceeding 65 it was held that despite the provision in the act
which recites that: "Nothing in this Act contained shall in any way
abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute,
but the provisions of this Act are in addition to such remedies," 66 a bill
in equity was not available to test the legality of the commission's action
and that the proper remedy was by way of section 402.
Two judges dissented in the "Jenny Wren" case and contended
that financial loss inflicted on an existing licensee to the extent that it
would destroy the ability of the station to operate in the public interest
was sufficient ground for invoking equitable jurisdiction.67 In the
Great Western Broadcasting Company case,68 the minority view of the
"Jenny Wren" case was adopted obiter dictum.
A group of cases which express the judicial philosophy toward the
construction to be given the appellate provision merits discussion. In
the first stage of its supervisory jurisdiction, the court of appeals
adopted a strict construction of the appeals provision. Only those applicants or licensees who came within the express provisions of section I 6,
as originally enacted and as amended, could invoke appellate jurisdiction. 60 Thus it was held that an applicant which had failed to pursue
the commission's formalized procedure, although it had participated in
the administrative proceedings, lacked an appealable interest to contest
65 Monocacy Broadcasting Co. v. Prall, 67 App. D. C. 176, 90 F. (2d) 421
(1937).
66
48 Stat. L. 1099 (1934), 47 U.S. C. (1934), § 414.
67
Justice Groner, with Justice Hitz concurring, Sykes v. Jenny Wren Co., 64
App. D. C. 379 at 382, 78 F. (2d) 729 (1935).
68
Great Western Broadcasting Assn. Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm.,
68 App. D. C. II9 at 123, 94 F. (2d) 244 (1937): "we think it [consideration of
economic factors] is a necessary part of the problem submitted to the commission in the
application for broadcasting facilities. In any case where it is shown that the effect
of granting a new license will be to defeat the ability of the holder of the old license
to carry on in the public interest, the application should be denied unless there are
overweening reasons of a public nature for granting it."
60
The philosophy of strict statutory interpretation was first applied in Universal
Service Wireless, Inc. v. Federal Radio Comm., 59 App. D. C. 319 at 321, 41 F. (2d)
II3 (1930), wherein it was stated: "The right of appeal being a statutory one, the
court cannot dispense with its express provisions, even to the extent of doing equity."
Appellants in this case were public service point-to-point stations engaged in the transmission of press communications as distinguished from regular broadcast licensees. The
foregoing quotation was cited with approval in broadcast cases. See infra, notes 70
and 71.
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the validity of the commission's action. 70 Similarly in the Pote case 71
an order of the commission refusing a transfer or assignment of broadcasting facilities was declared not appealable. 72 Justice Groner concurred in the result of the majority, but was of the opinion that an
application to transfer a previously existent license is· an application within the purview of section 16 and was therefore appealable. It is
believed that the court will reverse the Pote case and hold that an
application to transfer a station license is a modification of license,73
70 Telegraph Herald Co. v. Federal Radio Comm., 62 App. D. C. 240 at 242,
66 F. (2d) 220 (1933). Appellant addressed a letter to the commission indicating a
desire to apply for a local broadcast station. This letter "did not amount to a legal
application, nor was appellant an applicant for the removal or modification of an existing
station license.• ; • And in contemplation of law appellant was not a corporation aggrieved or whose interests were adversely affected by the decision of the Commission••••" The commission had authorized another station to move to the community
where appellant was located.
71 Pote v. Federal Radio Commission, 62 App. D. C. 303, 67 F. (2d) 509
(1933), cert. denied 290 U. S. 680, 54 S. Ct. 103 (1933).
72 Section 12 of the Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. L. 1162 at 1167, provided
that "The station license required hereby, the frequencies or wave lengths authorized
to be used by the licensee, and the rights therein granted shall not be transferred,
assigned, or in any manner, either voluntarily or involuntarily, disposed of to any person, firm, company, or corporation without the consent in writing of the licensing
authority." Section 310 (b) of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. L. 1086,
47 U. S. C. (1934), § 310 (b), is an almost verbatim reproduction of section 12 of
the Radio Act of 1927.
73 When a person requests a construction permit, he makes application for a new
broadcast station or an improvement in an existing facility. In both instances, he must
show that he possesses the legal and technical qualifications, that there is available economic support, and most important, that there is a need for the facilities requested.
In a transfer case, the transferee must likewise show that he is legally and technically
qualified, but there is no requirement that he show that there is a need for broadcasting
facilities. The latter has been established by the commission's original grant to the
transferor. Since a transfer of license involves the substitution of one licensee for another,
it might properly be regarded as a modification of the license, rather than a construction
permit.
On November 29, 1939, the court of appeals handed down its decision in Associted Broadcasters Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm., (App. D. C. 1939) 108 F.
(2d) 737, wherein Associated Broadcasters Inc. appealed from the action of the commission, which had refused to consent to the assignment of license from appellant to the
Columbia Broadcasting System. The commission moved to dismiss the appeal. The court
held that it had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal under section 402(b)(1) of the
Communications Act of 1934. Justice Stephens dissented, relying on the Pote case.
The majority held that, since the transferee, Columbia, could have filed for the facilities of Associated Broadcasters, and the denial of that application would have brought
the applicant within the purview of section 402(b) (1) (see cases cited supra, note 58),
Columbia should not be aeprived of the right of judicial review in an assignment or
transfer case. An assignment of license is for all practical purposes the same as an outright request for the facilities of an existing license. The court also relied on the change
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and hence appealable under section 402 (b) (I) of the Communications
Act of 1934. But the philosophy of the court as expressed in the Pote
case must be compared with the Durham 14 decision. Section I 6 (a) (I)
in the language of section 310 (b) which provides in part that "The station license .••
shall not be transferred, assigned •.• unless tke Commission skall, after securing full
information, decide tkat said trans/er is in tke public interest, and shall give its consent
in writing." The italicized part of the above quotation is the new language which was
added to section 3 10(b). This section of the Communications Act, "as now phrased,
contemplates an application, a hearing, if necessary and a decision upon the basis of
public interest, just as much in the case of an application for the transfer of an outstanding license as in the case of an application for a proposed new station license."
It is believed that the legislative history of several provisions of the Radio Act
of 1927 throws some light on whether or not Congress intended that transfers or
assignments should be appealable. S. I and S. 1754, 69th Cong., Ist session (1926),
was one of the forerunners of the Radio Act of 1927. Section IO of S. 1754 contains
language which is similar, for all practical purposes, to section 16 of the Radio Act
of 1927. Section 10 contained the following paragraph, which was not incorporated in
the Radio Act of 1927: "All other decisions of the Secretary of Commerce, or of the
radio commission hereinafter established, shall be subject to the right of appeal by the
party aggrieved to the district court of the United States for the district in which
the appellant resides upon the same terms of procedure as hereinbefore provided for an
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia."
Extended hearings were held before the Committee on Interstate Commerce.
S. HEARINGS ON S. I AND S. 1754, 69th Cong., 1st sess. (1926). The following conversation is reported in ibid., part. 2, pp. II4-n6 (Feb. 26, 1926). Mr. Stephen B.
Davis, Jr., solicitor of the department of commerce, in commenting on that portion of
section IO quoted above suggested that it be stricken.
"Senator Dill [ who sponsored the Radio Act of 1927 in the Senate]: There are
matters, of course, that come up, my idea is, other than the granting of a license or the
revocation of a license, and it might be that such action should be in the court where
the station exists. That was my idea. I did not intend to cover by this mere discretionary matters that you have mentioned, but matters of a different sort. I did not
intend to cover matters which were merely local in which there was a ruling by the
Secretary of Commerce, and it seemed to me there should be action in the district
court where the matter occurred, rather than bringing them to Washington .•••
"Senator Wheeler: What I was getting at was what was meant by the 'decisions.'
That decisions could be meant other than the right to grant license or take it away?
"Senator Dill: For instance, the matter of transferring a license is one that might
come up, in which the Secretary might rule that they had no right to transfer a license.
"Senator Wheeler: That would not come up. There is no question a man can
transfer anything he has. The question is whether the man to whom the transfers go
can get a permit.
"Senator Dill: Under the terms of this bill his right to transfer is controlled;
it must be subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce. That is one of the
things I had in mind."
The conclusion is warranted that Congress intended that persons should have
the right of appeal in transfer cases in the Radio Act of 1927. Whether Congress in
clear terms provided for this right of appeal in the Radio Act of 1927 is another story.
74 Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Federal Radio Comm., 60 App. D. C. 375, 55 F.
(2d) 537 (1931). See also Pacific Development Radio Co. v. Federal Radio Comm.,
60 App. D. C. 378, 55 F. (2d) 540 (1931).
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of the 1930 amendment contained no phraseology which would permit
a person who had been refused a construction permit to appeal. The
court ruled that an application for increased power by an existing station, "when properly considered is not ·for a construction permit, but
for a modification of license." The court by authorizing applicants for
construction permits to invoke appellate jurisdiction applied a broad
construction to the appeals provision. The latter represents the only
instance wherein the court veered from its policy of strict construction.
A summary of the court's activities during this six-year period
discloses that the court exercised a minimum of judicial supervision
over the activities of the commission, and correspondingly the commission had a wide latitude in its administrative interpretation of the
act. This limited judicial scrutiny may be attributed to several factors.
The demand for federal control of radio broadcasting came from
the industry. Broadcasters recognized that some federal agency must
police the airways in order to prevent intolerable interference and
chaos such as occurred in the breakdown of 1926. Undoubtedly,
this demand by the industry for some federal regulatory agency
prompted the court to give a wide leeway to the Radio Commission in
its administration of communications.
Secondly, the Radio Commission was "notable for the direct connection and wide experience that many of its commissioners had had in
the industry they were called upon to regulate." 75 The personnel of
the first commission of five included two members who had had direct
experience in broadcasting,76 two members who had been active in the
communications branches of the Army and Navy, 11 and one member
who was a former justice of a state supreme court. 78 Their successors
included men who were connected with the industry, attorneys, a
lawyer-engineer, and a business-executive. 79 As Herring states, the
first nine appointees to the commission showed,
HERRING, FEDERAL CoMMISSIONERs 121 (1936).
lbid., 120-u3, 130-131. H. A. Bellows, before his appointment to the Radio
Commission, was manager of the Gold Medal Radio Corporation. 0. H. Caldwell was
an electrical engineer, and an associate editor of Electrical World, an important electrical engineering journal.
7 1Jbid., 121. Lieutenant Colonel Dillon was one of the first federal radio inspectors in the bureau of investigation; Rear Admiral Bullard, the first chairman, organized
the department of electrical engineering at the United States Naval Academy and was
superintendent of the United States Naval Radio Service.
78 Ibid., 122. E. 0. Sykes was justice on the Mississippi Supreme Court from
1916 to 1925.
79 lbid., 120-122. W. D. L .. Starbuck was an engineer and patent attorney, confirmed by the Senate on May 2, 1929. FEDERAL RAmo CoMMISSION, THIRD ANNUAL
75
76
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"a direct knowledge of one or more aspects of radio. The technical
qualifications of these commissioners were good. They brought to
their official duties experience in either the engineering, broadcasting or manufacturing phases of radio communications." 80
The public confidence in the commission undoubtedly was reflected in
the court's attitude to the agency.
Lastly, radio broadcasting is a highly technical subject matter calling for specialized knowledge and training in scientific engineering
principles. The court was reluctant to disturb the allocation plan of the
commission, or become embroiled in engineering issues of interference.
The judicial tribunal lacked the technical skill and competence which
is so necessary for the proper administration of radio communication.
The court thus confined its judicial activities to the procedural requisites of notice and hearing.
1937
Since the fall of 1937 the court of appeals has manifested a new
interest in radio broadcasting 80a and has exercised a broader judicial
supervision over the activities of the commission. This "new judicial
attitude" must ultimately be attributed to a lack of both public and
judicial confidence in the administrative process of the Federal Communications Commission. Several factors have contributed to this
"changed judicial attitude."
First, several of the recent decisions, such as the Heitmeyer 81 and
Saginaw 82 cases show a lack of thoroughness which is "apparent upon
CHANGED ATTITUDE AFTER

REPORT 1 ( 1929). Sam Pickard organized the first "college of the air" at Kansas
Agricultural College, was chief of the radio division in the department of agriculture
and was the first secretary of the commission. I. E. Robinson, the second chairman of
the commission, was formerly chief justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia. H. A. Lafount, at the time of his appointment to the commission, was "an
important figure ·in the religious, civic, and business life of Utah . • • and at the
time of his appointment was active head of the Great Western Radio Corporation."
HERRING, FEDERAL CoMM1ss10NERS 122 (1936).
80 HERRING, FEDERAL CoMMISSIONERS 121 (1936).
80a Justice Miller, "A Judge Looks at Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations," 26 A. B. A. J. 5, 64 at 65 (1940), states .that the Federal Communications
Commission is "one of the most frequent litigants in the United States Court of
Appeals."
81 Heitmeyer v. Federal Communications Comm., 68 App. D. C. 180, 95 F.
(2d) 91 ( 1937).
82 Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., 68 App. D. C.
282 at 291-292, 96 F. (2d) 554 (1938), cert. denied 305 U.S. 613, 59 S. Ct. 72
(1938): "Even though the inaccuracies alluded to may have been caused solely by
inadvertence rather than by arbitrary or capricious action, they nevertheless show that
the Commission's decision was not based upon that careful consideration of the evidence
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the record as it reaches the court, so as to lead the court to the conclusion that the evidence has [not] received the attention that it deserved
and 'that it would have received in the hands of one trained in legal
techniques." 88 It will be subsequently shown that the commission has
propounded a philosophy which seeks to immunize the agency from
judicial review 84 and to free the commission from judicial supervision. 85
Undoubtedly this has prompted the court to view the commission's
activities with suspicion.
Secondly, the administrative has been subject to a barrage of adverse criticism by the executive, 86 and legislative 87 branches of government. This adverse criticism is reflected in the newspapers,88 trade
which is properly to be expected from an unbiased body of experts discharging a
function so important from the standpoint of both the parties and the public." See,
Courier Post Publishing Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., (App. D. C. 1939)
104 F. (2d) 213; Sanders Brothers Radio Station v. Federal Communications Comm.,
70 App. D. C. 265, 106 F. (2d) 321 (1939), cert. granted (U.S. 1939) 60 S. Ct.
294.
83 Landis, "Administrative Policies and the Courts," 4 7 YALE L. J. 5 I 9 at 531
(1938).
84 Yankee Network, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm., (App. D. C. 1939)
107 F. (2d} 212.
85 Pottsville Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., 105 F. (2d)
36 (1939), reversed (U. S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 437; McNinch v. Heitmeyer, 105 F.
(2d) 41 (1939), reversed sub nom. Fly v. Heitmeyer, (U.S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 443; per
curiam opinion in Courier Post Publishing Co. v. Federal Communications Comm.,
dated June 30, 1939, and order dated August 2, 1939.
86 Letter of President Roosevelt to Senator Wheeler and Representative Lea on
January 24, 1939: "I am thoroughly dissatisfied with the present legal framework and
administrative machinery of the [Communications] Commission." Quoted in 16 Broadcasting, No. 3,p. II (February 1, 1939).
87 Senator White, "Regulation of Radio Communication," 81 CoNG. REc. 2332
ff. (1937); S. Res. 94 introduced by Senator White to investigate the commission
on March 6, 1939. 84 CoNG. REc., No. 45, p. 3213. See S. 1268, introduced by
Senator Wheeler to reorganize the Federal Communications Commission. 84 CoNG.
REc., No. 28, p. 1805 (1939). Remarks of Representative Connery for a Congressional
Investigation of Radio Monopoly, 83 CoNG. REc. 5284, 9315-9316 (1938). There
is complete discussion of the various congressional proposals for investigation and reorganization in VARIETY RADIO DIRECTORY 908 ff. (1939-1940).
88 Editorial in the WASHINGTON HERALD, October 13, 1939; WASHINGTON
DAILY NEws, October 17, 1939; General Hugh S. Johnson in WASHINGTON DAILY
NEws, October 17, 1939; 32 TIME, No. 17, p. 44 (Oct. 24, 1938); article by Pearson and Allen in WASHINGTON HERALD, November 3, 1938; article by Jerry Kluttz
in WASHINGTON DAILY NEws, November 28, 1938; article by Pearson and Allen in
WASHINGTON HERALD, December 24, 193 8; article by Thomas L. Stokes, WASHINGTON DAILY NEws, January 26, 1939; article by Doris Fleeson in WASHINGTON HERALD,
March 2, 1939; article by Richard Wilson in DEs MOINES REGISTER AND TRIBUNE,
March 30, 1939; column by Hugh S. Johnson in WASHINGTON DAILY NEws, June
IO, 1939•
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journals,8° and current literature.90 The latter has contributed to a lack:
of public confidence in the commission.
Thirdly, and in all probability the most important, there has been
an almost complete change in the personnel of the court since 1937.01
The new appointees to the bench have been disposed to make a vigorous
inquiry into the activities and administrative policies of the commission.
The foregoing factors have "instinctively" prompted the new court
to scrutinize the administrative process with greater care.
This "changed judicial attitude" has caused an almost complete
overhauling and clarification of the appeals proviso. This was presaged
by the Missouri Broadcasting Corporation case,82 which clarified a longcontroverted provision of the statute. 98 Section 402 ( c), which sets
forth the mechanics for taking an appeal, provides in substance that
within thirty days after the filing of an appeal,
"the Commission shall file with the court the originals or certified
copies of all papers and evidence presented to it upon the application involved, and also a like copy of its decision thereon, and shall
within thirty days thereafter file a full statement in writing of the
facts and grounds for its decision as found and given by it, and a
89 RADIO DAILY, November IZ, 1937, June 3, 1938, June 13, 1938, June 24,
1938, July IO, 1938, March 27, 1939; VARIETY, November 30, 1937, March 22,
1938, June 8, 1938, June 15, 1938, June 14, 1939; Werne, "Radio Censorship and
Federal Regulation," 72 EDITOR AND PUBLISHER, No. 27, § 1, p. 16 (July 8, 1939);
16 BROADCASTING, No. 5, p. l (March l, 1939); 16 ibid., No. XI,. p. 13 (June 1,
1939); 16 ibid., No. 6, p. 13 (March 15, 1939); 16 ibid., No. 12, p. I2 (June 15,
(1939).
'
90 Article by Frost in KEN MAGAZINE, December 15, 1938; Patten, "Radio Gets
the Jitters," 127 AMERICAN MAGAZINE, No. 3, p. 42 (March, 1939); "Federal Communications Commission" 17 FoRTUNE, No. 5, p. 60 (May, 1938); SUMMERS, RADio
CENSORSHIP (1939). See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CoMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE, Monograph No. 3, FEDERAL CoMMUNICATioNs CoMMISSION, vol. 2, c. 7,
"Congressional Lobbying" ( 1940) (Dept. of Justice, mimeographed) •
91 From 1930 to 1935, Chief Justice Martin and Associate Justices Robb, Van
Orsdel, Hitz and Groner were members of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. On July 24, 1939, Justice Stephens succeeded Justice Hitz,
Justice Groner ,was appointed Chief Justice on December 7, 1937, and Associate
Justices Miller, Edgerton, and Vinson were appointed in 1937 and 1938. 65 App.
D. C. iii (1936) and 68 App. D. C. iii (1938). Justice Rutledge was appointed on
May 2, 1939. See concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Graves v. People of
State of New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 at 487, 59 S. Ct. 595 (1939).
92 Missouri Broadcasting Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm., 68 App. D. C.
154, 94 F. (2d) 6z3 (1937), cert. denied 303 U.S. 655, 58 S. Ct. 759 (1938).
98 Ibid., at 156: "The question here presented is not new." It was first raised in
Ansley v. Federal Radio Comm., 60 App. D. C. 19, 46 F. (zd) 600 (1930), and in
particular appellant's brief at page 39.
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list of all interested persons to whom it has mailed or otherwise
delivered a copy of said notice of appeal." 9 "'
The administrative interpretation of this provision had resulted in the
practice of issuing an order either granting or denying an application,
and at a subsequent date-two to four weeks later-publishing a statement of facts and grounds for decision. The Missouri Broadcasting
Corporation contended that the commission was without statutory or
constitutional authority to enter post factum findings. The comµussion
answered this contention by stating that the rendition of findings subsequent to the order complained of was valid, and that it could ·file its
written decision after an appeal had been noted in court.95 Justice
Groner stated that if the commission's construction of this section prevailed, an appellant would be in the anomalous and undesirable position
of attempting to assign errors of appeal without knowing the grounds
or reasons of the commission's order.
"an even greater injustice might result ( and we have the commission's assurance that' such procedure would be proper) if the commission seized the opportunity to write its statement of facts and
grounds for decision as an answer to appellant's reason for appeal.
We think reflection upon the bare statement of this possibility is
convincing that no such procedure can be allowed." 96
The court ruled that the language of the statute which required "a full
statement in writing of the facts and grounds for decision as found and
given by it," meant that the commission should issue a brief factual
statement and the reasons for its action contemporaneous with its order.
In the event that an appeal should be filed, the commission may make
more complete and detailed findings of fact. In the Heitmeyer 91 case
the court went one step further and held that the findings of fact which
the commission is required to file within sixty days after an appeal
48 Stat. L. 1093, 47 U.S. C. (1934), § 402(c).
The commission, in its brief in the Missouri Broadcasting Corporation case,
pp. 8-9, advanced the argument that "the only finding" the Commission is required
to make under the Communications Act of 1934 is that of "public interest, convenience
and necessity.•••" The evidence upon which the finding is made need not be incorporated in the order. The court disposed of this contention in a single sentence by
referring to the provisions of the statute which require a full statement in writing of
the facts and grounds for its decision.
96 Missouri Broadcasting Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm., 8 App. D. C.
154 at 157, 94 F. (2d) 623 (1937).
91 Heitmeyer v. Federal Communications Comm., 68 App. D. C. 180 at 182,
95 F. (2d) 91 (1937).
9 "'

95
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is taken must be complete and adequate and "of the same general form
and character as findings of fact well known to trial courts."
The Heitmeyer case merits extended discussion since it illustrates
the necessity and value of judicial review. This decision, written by
Justice Miller, carefully analyzes the administrative decision, sentence
by sentence, to determine whether or not there was substantial evidence
to support the findings of fact. The commission had declared that the
applicant was not financially qualified to own and operate a broadcasting station. This conclusion was based on an agreement whereby one
Glasman, the publisher of a newspaper, placed a deposit of $20,000 to
the credit of Heitmeyer. Under the terms of this agreement Heitmeyer:
was to form a corporation and apply to the commission to assign the
license of the station to the corporation. The applicant was to pay six
per cent interest on the principal and repay the loan within five years.
In the event the loan was not paid within this period of time, Heitmeyer would assign forty-nine per cent of the stock of the proposed
licensee corporation to Glasman. The commission concluded that since
the loan was not covered by sufficient collateral or other security to
insure against the lien, foreclosure, and seizure of the physical equipment of the station, in case the loan was not repaid within five years,
Heitmeyer was not financially qualified. A subsidiary ground for denying the application was the fact that the loan was conditioned on an
application for assignment of license which was not before the commission. This would require the commission to prejudge an application which was not properly before it at that time.
The court as a matter of law declared that the commission's policy
of refusing to grant a construction permit to an individual because the
applicant contemplates the formation of a corporation to which the
license will be assigned
"verge [ s] closely upon arbitrary and capricious action. It would
seem to be a rather idle and expensive gesture to require the
formation of a corporation for such a purpose before the securing
of a construction permit, when a refusal to grant the permit would
automatically abort the whole occasion and purpose of the corporation. It would seem on its face to be a rather severe restriction
upon business enterprise and an unnecessary limitation upon the
availability of radio service in a particular community." 98
Justice Miller, in analyzing that part of the commission's reasoning
which disapproved of the plan of financing the station with borrowed
98

lbid., at 186-187.
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money, suggested that "the public is entitled to have the statute implemented by a regulation setting out clearly and concisely just what
the Commission regards as a minimum standard of financial ability."
The commission's conclusion that the borrowed money was unsupported by collateral and that the station equipment might be subject
to lien, foreclosure, or sale at the termination of the five year period
was regarded as an arbitrary and capricious standard of financial responsibility and "would seem to constitute much more than the average of
business security. If the standard of financial responsibility required
by the Commission in this case were imposed upon the country generally, business would cease." The commission was forewarned that it
must exercise its discretion in conformity with the standard of public
interest, that it must carefully observe the procedure established by
Congress, and that "convenience of administration cannot 'be permitted
to justify noncompliance with the law, or the substitution of fiat for
adjudication." 99
The Heitmeyer case illustrates the value of judicial review, and
in particular the competency of the court to evaluate the policies and
principles of the commission in relationship to accepted standards of
business conduct. There can be no doubt that the commission's policy of
penalizing applicants because they proposed at a later date to form a
corporation represented a too literal, and thus a distorted, interpretation of the Communications Act. Similarly the measure of financial
responsibility imposed on new applicants was narrow and constrained
and ignored the ordinary standards of business safety. It would appear
that the administrative interpretation of financial responsibility was
severely canalized by the technical and specialized aspects of radio
broadcasting, whereas the judicial process viewed this standard in relationship to the entire field of business enterprise.100
The Saginaw 101 and Tri-State 102 cases amplified the principle enunciated in the Heitmeyer case and ruled that findings of fact to support
an order must include basic or underlying facts from which the ultimate
99

Ibid., at 187, 189.
Dickinson, "Judicial Control of Official Discretion," 22 AM. PoL. Sci. REV.
275 at 279 (1928): "A technical agency dealing constantly with a highly specialized
class of problems is always in danger of losing its sense of proportion at the points
where its narrow field impinges on wider problems." Cf. McFARLAND, Jumc1AL
CoNTROL OF THE FEDERAL TRADE CoMM1ss10N AND THE INTERSTATE CoMMERCE
COMMISSION 17 (1933).
101
Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., 68 App. I:>.
282, 96 F. (2d) 554 (1938).
102
Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., 68 App. D. C.
292, 96 F. (2d) 564 ( 1938).
100

e.
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facts or conclusions in the terms of the statutory criterion are inferred.
Justice Stephens spelled out a fact-finding standard "which a commission properly follows in reaching a decision." 108 The latter was
undoubtedly prompted by several inaccuracies in the commission's
decision. The Tri-State case elaborated on the Saginaw decision by
requiring that there be a "rational or coherent relationship between the
basic and the ultimate facts, that the latter shall flow logically from the
former." 104 Thus the court applies a general test of reasonableness to
the administrative activities of the commission and demands a reasonable exercise of administrative discretion having a logical relationshp
to the facts. 105 Finally in the Sanders Brothers case,106 the failure of the
commission to make adequate findings of fact on the issue of economic
injury resulted in a reversal of the commission's decision and the
judicial ruling that the statement of facts and grounds for decision must
contain basic and ultimate facts on all clearly defined issues. There
was sufficient evidence in the record to prepare appropriate findings of
fact on this issue since they had been incorporated into the commission's
brief. But the court ruled that, "it is not sufficient that they be marshalled and presented in the brief on appeal. They must be prepared
as findings of fact, upon which the decision of the Commission may be
rested." 101
Saginaw case, 68 App. D. C. at 287: "In discussing the necessary content of
findings of fact, it will be helpful to spell out the process which a commission properly
follows in reaching a decision. The process necessarily includes four parts: ( 1) evidence
must be taken and weighed, both as to its accuracy and credibility; (2) from attentive
consideration of this evidence a determination of facts of a basic or underlying nature
must be reached; (3) from these basic facts the ultimate facts, usually in the language
of the statute, are to be inferred or not, as the case may be; (4) from this finding the
decision will follow by the application of the statutory criterion."
104
Tri-State case, 68 App. D. C. at 295.
lOG DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW 143-144
(1927h Levitt, "The Judicial Review of Executive Acts," 23 M1cH. L. REv. 588
at 600 (1925). In Courier Post Publishing Co. v. Federal Communications Commission,
(App. D. C. 1939) 104 F. (2d) 213 at 217 it was said: "The Supreme Court has
declared substantial evidence to be 'more than a mere scintilla, and must do more than
create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established. "It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion" and
it must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when
the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury.' " Quoting
National Labor Relations Board v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U. S.
292 at 300, 59 S. Ct. 501 (1939), which in turn quoted Consolidated Edison Co.
v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197 at 229, 59 S. Ct. 206 (1938).
106
Sanders Brothers Radio Station v. Federal Communications Comm., 70 App.
D. C. 265, 106 F. {2d) 321 (1939), cert. granted (U.S. 1939) 60 S. Ct. 294.
101
Ibid., 106 F. (2d) at 326.
108
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An unreported decision, the so-called Brooklyn cases,108 decided
in the fall of 1938, was reversed on the commission's admission of error
that there were no findings of basic facts to support the order. The
Brooklyn cases are significant because of the size and expense of the
printed record. 109 This decision contributed to the new rules enacted
by the court on September 1, 1939, which were specifically designed to
shorten the record and cut down appellate costs.110
,
Four decisions have been rendered since the fall of 1937' which
confirm an established principle of administrative law-that applicants
must exhaust all prescribed applicable administrative remedies before
invoking appellate jurisdiction. Section 405 m of the Communications
Act provides that any party aggrieved or whose interests are adversely
affected by any decision, order, or requirement of the commission may
petition for rehearing within twenty days after the effective date
thereof. The first case established two propositions: that the foregoing
administrative remedy "is not to supplant, but to supplement, that of
appellate review," and that the filing of a petition for rehearing suspends the running of time' ~ithin ·which an appeal may be taken, hence
a litigant has twenty days from final action on a petition for rehearing
within which to note an appeal.112 This opinion contained dictum to the
effect that "it is doubtful, moreover, whether this court would have
jurisdiction to entertain an appeal while such petition was pending
before the Commission." This dictum became a controlling principle in
two subsequent cases, wherein petitions for rehearing were recognized
· as statutory rights which the commission was without power to refuse
to entertain.118
The Red River case 114 went one step further by requiring an ap108 Voice of Brooklyn, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm., No. 7044 (1938);
United States Broadcasting Corporation v. Federal Communications Comm., No.
7045.
109 The record in this case totaled I 572 pages and cost $3,768.96. In 2 FED.
CoM. B. J., No. 7, pp. 2-4 (1938), there is tabulated the costs of taking appeals from
decisions of the Federal Radio Commission and the Federal Communications Commission to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
110 Rule No. 32 of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 11 DIGEST OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME CouRT REPORTS, SuPP. No. I,
CouRT RuLEs 8 (1940).
m 48 Stat. L. 1095, 47 U. S. C. (1934), § 405.
112 Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., 68 App. D. C.
282 at 286, 96 F. (2d) 554 (1938).
118 Southland Industries Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm., 69 App. D. C.
82, 99 F. (2d) 117 (1938); Woodmen of the World Life Ins. As~n. v. Federal
Communications Comm., 69 App. D. C. 87, 99 F. (2d) 122 (1938).
114 Red River Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm., 69 App.
D. C. 1, 98 F. (2d) 282 (1938), cert. denied 305 U. S. 625, 59 S. Ct. 86 (1938).
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pellant to exhaust all prescribed and applicable remedies before resorting to the court. Appellant was the licensee of an existing broadcasting
station which had neither been made a party to, nor intervened in a
hearing on, the application of one Baxter for a new radio broadcasting
facility in the same community wherein appellant was located. The
commission granted the Baxter application. Red River Broadcasting
Company appealed pursuant to section 402 (b) ( 2) of the act, claiming
that the grant of the Baxter application had been made without notice
to or hearing accorded appellant and that the application had been
granted without consideration of its probable deleterious economic
effect upon appellant. Baxter intervened in the appeal and moved to
dismiss the same because appellant had failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before invoking the jurisdiction of the appellate
tribunal. The Communications Act and the rules and regulations then
in effect offered four methods to an existing licensee to participate in a
hearing. Appellant could petition to intervene in the proceedings,m
petition for a continuance 116 or extension of time, request an informal
hearing,111 or apply for rehearing under section 405 of the act. Red
River, in its brief, contended that petitions to invoke the foregoing
administrative remedies, particularly intervention, would be a futile
gesture because it was the announced rule and policy of the commission
to deny permission to existing licensees to participate in hearings when
the latter alleged a possible deterioration of service through economic
competition. The court held that appellant had actual notice of th~
Baxter application before the last of the four administrative remedies
became unavailable. Red River could have applied for a petition for
rehearing in lieu of taking an appeal, since the time allowed to invoke
section 40 5 is identical with the time allowed to file an appeal. "It is
inconceivable that appellant could have had sufficient notice to take an
appeal and not have had sufficient notice to seek at least one administrative remedy." The principle of law was reaffirmed that appellant
_was not entitled to judicial relief because it had failed to exhaust section 405, the applicable administrative remedy. The court suggested
that "its [appellant's] duty was to seek the first administrative remedy
115

Paragraph 105.20 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (1935): "Any
party may, at any time, more than ten days prior to the date of any hearing, file with
the Commission a petition to intervene. If the petition discloses a substantial interest in
the subject matter of the hearing, the Commission may grant the same and permit
the petitioner to be heard at such hearing." See also paragraphs 102.6, 102.1, and
102.7. The foregoing regulations have been superseded by the new Rules of Practice
and Procedure effective August 1, 1939, 4 FED. REG. 3341-3355 (1939).
116
Rule 106.5.
117 Rule 106.2.
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available to it before the Commission." Appellant's contention that its
attempt to invoke administrative remedies would have been denied,
was answered by the statement that this was an assumption and that
appellant "cannot be heard to complain in this court that there was any
danger of refusal when it made no effort to do so." 118
The Red River decision has been criticized by several commentators.110 As a general rule the courts have not demanded application for
administrative rehearing as preliminary to judicial relief unless the
statute specifically required such an application. 120 The Red River case
represents a departure from the general rule, since the omission to apply
for rehearing under a permissive statute constituted a failure to exhaust
the administrative remedy. The opinion of the court suggests that
whether or not an application for administrative rehearing must be
made rests within the judicial discretion of the court.121 Applications
for, rehearing should be availed of by aggrieved parties to correct erroneous :findings of fact or to hear ·newly discovered evidence, but
where a question of law is presented, viz., whether or not the commission must consider economic factors in its administration of the act,
it would appear that the court with its competence in dealing with
questions of law could have dispensed with the permissive administrative remedy.122
Several decisions have been rendered which describe the allegations
necessary for a statement of reasons for appeal. The court has applied
the same standard which governs a plaintiff who seeks to invoke the
equitable jurisdiction of a district court by a bill in equity.123 Thus
118 Red River Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., 69 App.
D. C. 1 at 5, 6-7, 98 F. (2d) 282 (1938).
119 Berger, "Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies," 48 YALE L. J. 981 (1939);
27 GEORGETOWN L. J. 783 (1939).
120 51 HARV. L. REv. 1251 at 1262 (1938): "Usually the courts do not require
application to the commission for a rehearing before suit may be maintained." Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co., 262 U. S. 43, 43 S. Ct. 466 (1923); United
States v. Abilene & Southern Ry., 265 U.S. 274, 44 S. Ct. 565 (1924). The Federal
Power Commission Act expressly requires a petition for rehearing before appellate
jurisdiction can be invoked, 49 Stat. L. 860 (1935), 16 U. S. C. (Supp. 1938), §
825 1. The court in the Red River case relied on Goldsmith v. United States Board
of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. II7, 46 S. Ct. 215 (1926), to substantiate its position. It
is submitted that the reasoning in the latter case is not particularly convincing. See also
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 58 S. Ct. 459 (1938).
121 Southland Industries Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm., 69 App. D. C.
8:i, 99 F. (2d) II7 (1938).
122 See citations in note l 19, supra.
But compare Justice Miller, "A Judge
Looks at Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations," 26 A. B. A. J. 5 at 6-7
(1940).
123 ''When this court acts upon an appeal from the Commission the proceeding
is similar in nature ;to an equitable proceeding to restrain the enforcement of an
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general and vague assignments of error which fail to set forth in particularity how the financial or economic interests of an existing licensee
will be affected will be dismissed. 124 Similarly the assignment of argumentative and abstract propositions of law as reasons for appeal lack
the jurisdictional requisites necessary to invoke judicial action. 125
A perplexing problem before the , court is the formalization of
appealable interest to determine who may invoke appellate jurisdiction. Section 402 (b) (I), which provides that an appeal may be taken
by an applicant for a construction permit, license, renewal of license,
or modification of license whose application has been refused, would
appear to be free from ambiguity since it specifies the classes of applicants entitled to judicial relief. But in the Crosley case 120 the question
before the court was whether a "temporary experimental authorization"
to operate with increased power was a license which was subject to
judicial review. The maximum power for clear channel stations is fifty
kilowatts.121 In August 1934, the commission authorized the Crosley
invalid administrative order." Red River Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm., 69 App. D. C. 1 at 3, note 2, 98 F. (2d) 282 (1938). See also Federal
Radio Commission v. Nelson Brothers Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U. S. 266 at 277,
53 S. Ct. 627 (1933); Great Western Broadcasting Assn., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm., 68 App. D. C. II9 at 123, 94 F. (2d) 244 (1937); Yankee Network,
Inc. v. Communications Comm., (App. D. C. 1939) 107 F. (2d) 212.
124 Yankee Network Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm., (App. D. C. 1939)
107 F. (2d) 212.
125 Stuart v. Federal Communications Comm., 70 App. D. C. 265, 105 F. (2d}
788 (1939).
Two decisions have been handed down since October 1, 1939, viz: WOKO
Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm., {App. D. C.) Docket No. 7312, decided
December II, 1939; Florida Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm.,
(App. D. C.) Docket No. 7347, decided December II, 1939, which set forth with
greater particularity the necessary allegations in a notice of appeal in order to enable
an appellant to invoke the jurisdiction of the court under section 402(b) (2). Thus
the allegation in a statement of reasons for appeal that the "result of the Commission's
decision will be to destroy the ability of the appellant to carry on--or to render service
-in the public interest," is sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. Florida
Broadcasting Co. case, supra. But a reduction in income, a loss of a large portion of a
station's listening audience, or a depletion of talent and program material which will
result in the deterioration of the program service of an existing licensee are not sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Appellant must allege that
he is aggrieved to the extent that the public interest, convenience, or necessity would
suffer. WOKO Inc. case, supra. The importance of the statement of points on appeal
was stressed by Justice Miller, "A Judge Looks at Judicial Review of Administrative
Determinations," 26 A. B. A. J. 5 at 9 (1940).
126 Crosley Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm., {App. D. C. 1939) 106
F. {2d) 833, cert. denied (U. S. 1939) 60 S. Ct. 142.
127 Paragraph 117 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, now superseded by
§ 3.22 of FEDERAL CoMMUNICATIONS CoMMISSION, RuLEs GovERNING STANDARD
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Radio Corporation, licensee of station WLW, to increase its power
from fifty to five hundred kilowatts upon "the express condition that
it may be terminated by the Commission at f!,ny time without advance
notice or hearing if in its discretion the need for such action arises."
Renewals of this authorization were made from time to time to 1939.
After an extended hearing before a committee of three commissioners,
the commission refused to renew WLW's experimental authorization.
Appellant sued out an appeal, under section 402(b)(1), wherein it
alleged and likewise urged in its brief that this temporary authorization was a license. The commission moved to dismiss the appeal on th~
ground that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal under
any of the provisions of the appeal section of the act. The majority of
the court did not deem it necessary to decide whether the temporary
authorization was a license. The appeal was dismissed on the ground
that the temporary special authorization was a contractual arrangement
which could be withdrawn by the commission. Justice Stephens concurred in the result but was of the opinion that the majority should
"limit itself to the narrow ground that either the 'special temporary experimental authorization' was void because beyond the
power of the Commission under the statute, or it was a kind of
license not subject to the provisions of the statute concerning
notice, hearing and review, and that in either such event the appellant would have no right of appeal to this court." 128
There is no provision in the statute authorizing the commission to grant
temporary experimental authorizations; neither does the statute author'ize the commission to attach conditions in granting licenses or permits.
'it would therefore appear that the commission in fact granted a license
under several provisions of the act,129 or else the authorization was void
BROADCAST STATIONS, effective August 1, 1939, 4 FED. REG. 2715 (1939), which
provides that the maximum power for clear channel stations is 50 kilowatts.
128 Crosley Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm., (App. D. C. 1939) 106
F. (2d) 833 at 836.
129 48 Stat. L. 1081 (1934), 47 U.S. C. (1934), § 301: "No person shall use
or operate any apparatus for the transmission of energy or communications or signals by
radio • . . except under and in accordance with this Act and with a license in that
behalf granted under the provisions of this Act." 48 Stat. L. 1085 (1934), 47 U.S. C.
(1934), § 309(a): "If upon examination of any application for a station license or for
the renewal or modification of a station license the Commission shall determine that
public interest, convenience, or necessity would be served by the granting thereof,
it shall authorize the issuance, renewal, or modification thereof in accordance with said
finding. In the event the Commission upon examination of any such application does
not reach such decision with respect thereto, it shall notify the applicant thereof, shall
fix 'and give •notice of a time and place for hearing thereon, and shall afford such:
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because beyond the power of the commission. The majority opinion
avoids this conflict of issues. But if the "special temporary experimental
authorization" is not a license, then the operation of WLW was a criminal offense, and it is clear that neither the commission nor the owners
of WLW intended that the operation should be anything but lawful.
It is believed that the commission's administrative practice 180 and the
provisions of the act quoted in the margin 131 spell out a license.
In the Pulitzer case,132 the court ruled that an existing licensee
which had applied for an increase of hours of operation and had not
as yet been refused could not invoke section 402 (b) (I) to complain
against the granting of a new broadcasting facility in the same community. The Pittsburgh Radio Supply House decision 133 affirmed the
principle established in the previous opinion. Existing licensees of
regional stations with applications pending to increase power to five
kilowatts at night, which application violated the commission's regulation 134 limiting the maximum power ~f regional stations to one kilowatt
at night, had no appealable interest to challenge the grant of a station
on the same frequency. Appellants had assigned as error the action of
the commission in entering its order, first denying the application in the
morning, and then in the afternoon granting the aforesaid application
applicant an opportunity to be heard under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe." 48 Stat. L. noo (1934), 47 U.S. C. (1934), § 501: "Any person who willfully and knowingly does or causes or suffers to be done any act, matter, or thing, in
this Act prohibited or declared to be unlawful, or who willfully and knowingly omits
or fails to do any act, matter, or thing in this Act required to be done, or wilfully
and knowingly causes or suffers such omission or failure, shall, upon conviction thereof,
be punished for such offense, for which no penalty (other than a forfeiture) is provided herein, by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for a term of
not more than two years, or both."
13 ° Caldwell, "Developments in the Law of Federal Regulation of Broadcasting,"
VARIETY YEAR-BooK 896, 966 (1939-1940): "The same device of 'special experimental authorization' has been used for years to cover up departures from regulations
so as to permit duplication on certain of the clear channels, power in excess of the
maximum permitted on regional channels, and other special privileges which have been
continuously enjoyed on a regular commercial basis."
131 Supra, note 129.
132 Pulitzer Publishing Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., 68 App. D. C.
124, 94 F. (2d) 249 (1937).
138 Pittsburgh Radio Supply House v. Federal Communications Comm., 69 App.
D. C. 22, 98 F. (2d) 303 (1938).
134 Paragraph 120 of the Rules and Regulations, now superseded by § 3.22(c)
of FEDERAL CoMMUNICATioNs CoMMISSION, RuLEs GovERNING STANDARD BROADCAST
STATIONS, effective August 1, 1939, 4 FED. REG. 2715 (1935). Section 3.22(c)
authorizes five kilowatt operation at night on regional frequencies, provided that the
stations requesting the same meet certain minimum engineering standards.
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on the basis of the identical record. The court stated that it had no
right to consider this "claimed irregularity" since none o{ the appellants had an appealable interest. But there can be no doubt that this
irregular action abetted a skeptical judicial attitude towards the administrative process. The appeal in the Pittsburgh case was dismissed,
whereas the Pulitzer decision was affirmed. The significant difference
between affirmance and dismissal is that the court considers all of
appellant's contentions where a decision is affirmed-if one of the
assignments of error is valid, the case would be reversed; whereas in a
dismissal the court does not pass upon the alleged irregularity of
administrative action because the appellant is not believed to be aggrieved or adversely affected. The Pulitzer and Pittsburgh cases are
inconsistent in this respect.
A more difficult question, and one which will require further judicial definition, is to determine who may invoke the provisions of section
402 (b) ( 2) permitting an appeal "by any other person aggrieved or
whose interests are adversely affected by any decision of the Commission granting or refusing any such application." This much is clear.
An existing licensee who alleges that the grant of an application will
result in objectionable interference and cause a reduction in its service
area is a person aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected.185
But may appellate jurisdiction be invoked by existing licensees who
claim that the grant of additional facilities to the same community
will result in destructive ruinous competition to the extent that their
operation in the public interest will be impaired?
The next chapter in the story of the commission's position towards
economic factors is now appropriate. The commission, in view of the
dictum in the Great Western case,136 included economic issues in hearing
notices, and cited existing licensees as respondents on that basis. In the
Tri-State case,187 an existing licensee who sought protection against
destructive competition with a consequent deterioration of program
service appealed. The court did not discuss the question of appealable
interest, but reversed the commission because of the latter's failure to

185 Cases cited in notes 132 and 133, supra; Woodmen of the World Life Ins.
Soc. v. Federal Communications Comm., (App. D. C. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 75, cert.
denied (U.S. 1939) 60 S. Ct. II2.
186 Great Western Broadcasting Assn., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm.,
68 App. D. C. II9, 94 F. (2d) 244 (1937).
187 Tri-State Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm., 68 App.
D. C. 292, 96 F. (2d) 564 (1938).
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make appropriate findings of fact. In the Sanders B'l'others case 188 an
existing licensee alleged financial and economic injury, a large loss of
operating revenue, an impairment of service to the listening audience
and a destruction of program service.
"These reasons were clearly adequate to present an issue of 'economic injury to an existing station through the establishment of an
additional station ...' and that statement of issue is sufficient to
furnish proper grounds of contest on appeal." 139
A fortiori, appellant was an aggrieved person whose interests were
adversely affected. A petition for rehearing was filed in the Sanders
Brothers case suggesting that economic injury was damnum absque
injuria.140 The identical contentions were advanced in the Yankee Network case,141 wherein an existing licensee alleged economic injury
through the establishment of a new station in the same community.
This appeal was dismissed because appellant had not assigned sufficient
reasons of appeal to give the court jurisdiction. The opinion by Justice
Miller fully reconsidered this problem and held that economic injury
which will result in a severe loss of operating revenue so as to impair
the service of a licensee and destroy its ability to render proper service
in the public interest was within the purview of section 402 (b) ( 2).
The court has thus restricted a "person aggrieved" to licensees who
would suffer destructive objectionable interference or destructive economic competition.m It would appear that this represents a rather
188 Sanders Brothers Radio Station v. Federal Communications Comm., 70 App.
D. C. 297, 106 F. (2d) 321 (1939), cert. granted (U.S. 1939) 60 S. Ct. 294.
189
Ibid., 106 F. (2d) at 323.
140 The commission's petition for rehearing in the Sanders case was denied on
August 2, 1939.
141 Yankee Network, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm., (App. D. C. 1939)
107 F. (2d) 212.
H 2 Four decisions have been handed down by the United States Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia since October 1, 1939, viz: Tri-State Broadcasting Co.
v. Federal Communications Comm., (App. D. C. 1939) 107 F. (2d) 956; Ward v.
Federal Communications Comm., (App. D. C. 1939) 108 F. (2d) 486; WOKO
Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm., Docket No. '7312, decided December II, 1939; and Florida Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm.,
Docket No. 7347, decided December II, 1939, which further define a "person
aggrieved." Aggrievement is measured not by injury to an existing licensee, but by
injury which will affect the public interest, convenience, or necessity. Thus in the
Tri-State case, supra, a reduction in income to an existing licensee "cannot be the
criterion of economic injury herein .•.." In the Ward case, supra, it would appear
that the court will apply the same principles when an aggrieved person claims he will
suffer objectionable electrical interference. In other words, electrical interference, or a
reduction in the service area of an existing licensee, is not sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. Appellant must allege and prove that as a r~ult of such aggrieve-
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narrow and constrained construction of section 402 (b) ( 2). Th·e legislative history of this provision 143 discloses that Congress intended "that
any person in interest feeling aggrieved should have the right of
appeal from the action of the commission to the Court of Appeals of
the District of Columbia...." iH Congress expressly used lay terminolment the public interest, convenience, or necessity would suffer. The effect of these
decisions is that an existing licensee must allege, and more important, prove, that the
establishment of a new station will so affect the operation of the former, that the public
interest will suffer thereby. Since every renewal of license must be based on the finding
that the public interest, convenience, or necessity will be served thereby, and since the
grant of interest of a new facility must also be based on a finding of public interest,
the ultimate issue before the commission is the balance of convenience between the
existing licensee and the new facility. Since the findings of fact by the commission are
conclusive in the court if supported by substantial evidence, and provided that there
is a rational basis in the evidence to support the commission's conclusions, an aggrieved
person would have difficulty in proving that the public interest, convenience, or necessity would suffer thereby.
143 "This portion of the Radio Act [referring to the 19~0 Amendment which
substituted a new appellate provision] was re-enacted in the form of Section 402(b) of
the 1934 Act and we can presume that the language was used in the latter Act in the
same sense as in the former." Yankee Network, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm.,
(App. D. C •. 1939) 107 F. (2d) 212 at 214, note 2.
1 ""' Statement by Mr. Davis, quoted further, infra. On April 14, 1930, Mr. White
of Maine offered H. R. II635 in the House. 72 CoNG. REc. 7051 (1930). This
bill contained some eleven amendments to the Radio Act of 1927. The 1930 amendment is a verbatim reproduction of section 9 of H. R. l 1635. The latter bill was
reported back without any amendments by the Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries on April 15, 1930. H. REP. 1179, 71st Cong., 2d sess.; 72 CoNG. REC.
7099 (1930). H. Rep. II79, p. 6, recites: "This bill amends II different sections
of the radio act or 1927 by clarifying and amplifying provisions dealing with procedure and administration. • .. Section 9 substitutes for section 16 of the act a more
efficacious and simple procedure in appeals." H. R. II635 was debated in the House.
See 72 CoNG. REc. 8050 et seq. (1930). The members of the committee who reported out H. R. II635 (H. REP. II79), Messrs. Lehlbach, Davis, and Abernethy,
explained the various amendments. See in particular the explanation of Mr. Davis, 72
CoNG. REC. 8052 ;(1930). H. R. II635 passed the House on April 30, 1930. 72
CoNG. REc. 8055 (1930). H. R. II635 was not considered in the Senate because
the latter could not devote sufficient time or consideration to this legislation. Therefore
on May -24, 1930, H. R. 12599 was introduced in the House and referred to the
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. 72 CoNG. REc. 9521 (1930). The
committee report on this bill, H. REP. 1665, 71st Cong., 2d sess. (1930), points out
that H. R.'.12599 is that part of H. R. II635 relating to the amendment of the
appeals provision and was offered as a separate bill. H. REP. 1665, p. 2, states: "The
purpose of the amendment is to clarify the procedure on appeal to the court from
decisions of the Federal Radio Commission, to more clearly define the scope of the
sub"ject matter of such appeals, and to insure a review of the decisions of the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia by the Supreme Court." The debate on H. R.
12599 was limited because it had previously been incorporated in H. R. u635 and
the latter had been fully discussed. Mr. Davis, a member of the committee that submitted H. REP. 1665, stated: "I am much gratified by the passage of this bill to amend
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ogy as distinguished from legal phraseology in drafting this provision in
order that the "independent man or the independent station [ may
obtain] more rights to appeal to the court. . . ." 145 The committee
reports and the debates suggest that Congress intended,that the court
exercise broad supervisory powers in order to check the extensive discretionary authority vested in the commission.146 A secular construction
of section 402 (b) ( 2) would obviously broaden the appellate jurisdiction of the court. For example, aggrievement caused by a loss in operating revenue, diminution in the number of listeners, or the depreciation of available talent material which would affect the ability of a
licensee to operate in the public interest, would constitute an appealable interest. 147 Administrative determinations as to the quantum of
-in fact-rewrite the appeal section of the present radio act. It is not only in the
interest of the public, but in the interest of orderly procedure. I never did like the
language of section 16 of the radio act. When the bill culminating in that act was
being considered, I criticized the appeal provision both in the committee and in the
House. I insisted that the provision was ambiguous and would prove unsatisfactory
and ineffective. In my minority views filed on said bill in the Sixty-ninth Congress, in
discussing the appeal provision, which the bill we have just passed supplants, I declared,
that 'the opportunity for review is a shadowy one, indeed.' In suggesting a number of
amendments to the pending bill in said minority views, I stated with respect to the
appeal provision, 'I further suggest that any person in interest feeling aggrieved should
have the right of appeal from the action of the Commission to the Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia or some other Federal court and that such court have
the right of review of the questions of law but that the findings of fact of the commission shall be conclusive.'" 72 CoNG. REc. II 530. The minority reports referred to
and which elaborate Mr. Davis' views are H. REP. 404, 69th Cong., 1st sess. (1926),
which accompanied H. R. 9108, and H. REP. 464, 69th Cong., 1st sess. (1926),
which accompanied H. R. 9971. The latter bills evolved into the Radio Act of 1927.
The minority views of Mr. Davis as set forth in these reports are extremely significant
in revealing the Congressional intent of the appeals provision. As a matter of fact, the
minority views advanced in 1926 became legislation in 1930. H. R. 12599, identical
with the House bill, was introduced in the Senate on June 24, 1930 and referred to the
Committee on Interstate Commerce, 72 CoNG. REc. II553 (1930). It was reported
back with S. REP. uo5, 71st Cong., 2d sess., which accompanied the bill on June 26,
1930. 72 CoNG. REc. II749. S. REP. uo5 filed a copy of H. REP. l 165 as its own
views. There was little debate in the Senate, 72 CoNG. REc. 1I881. The bill passed
the Senate on June 27, 1930, 72 CoNG. REv. 11882, and was subsequently signed
by the President.
145 Statement by Mr. Abernethy in 72 CoNG, REc. 8054 (1930).
146 See minority views of Mr. Davis in H. REP. 464, 69th Cong., 1st sess. (1926),
which accompanied H. R. 9971.
u 7 WOKO, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm., (App. D. C.) Docket No.
7312, decided December II, 1939: "Although these words [referring to Section
402(6)(2) ], when read literally, are susceptible of a very wide interpretation, it is
obvious that no such interpretation should be given to them, in view of the considerations set out above. Instead, it is apparent that the appealable interest of such a person
is dependent upon considerations of public interest inherent in the particular case.'' Cf.
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the aggrievement would be binding on the court save where constitutional 148 or jurisdictional 149 issues are present; but if the record
substantiates appellant's allegation that it would be aggrieved or adversely affected, regardless of the extent of the injury, the court
should entertain the appeal on the merits and consider all assignments
of error rather than circumscribe its jurisdiction to a consideration of
the extent of the aggrievement. 150 There is no constitutional inhibition
which would preclude the court from exercising such broad supervisory
powers, since any injury, regardless of the extent, presents a case or
controversy. 151 It must be remembered that since Congress is not required to provide a remedy in the courts from adverse action by the
Federal Communications Commission, it may correspondingly create
statutory rights supplementary to the common law which are subject
to judicial protection.152 Section 402 (b) ( 2) is a statutory right which
should be measured by congressional standards rather than by principles of the common law.153
The Yankee Network opinion is highly significant in revealing the
changed judicial attitude toward the lower tribunal. Implicit therein
and in answer to the commission's arguments is the desire of the court
to leave open the avenues of judicial review. Thus the commission's
contentions as set forth in its brief would restrict judicial review to a
person whose application had been refused or denied. On oral argument, though not in issue, the law department expanded this argument
by alleging that any possible grievance or affectation of interestSprunt & Son v. United States, 281 U.S. 249, 50 S. Ct. 315 (1930); Edward Hines
Yellow Pine Trustees v. United States, 263 U.S. 143, 44 S. Ct. 72 (1923).
148
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 40 S. Ct.
527 (1920); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 56 S. Ct.
720 (1936).
149
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. ?,2, 52 S. Ct. 285 (1932) •
15
•
°Cf. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc. v. Federal Communications Comm.,
(App. D. C. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 75, and cases cited supra, note 142.
151
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 31 S. Ct. 250 (1911); Tutun v.
United States, 270 U.S. 568, 46 S. Ct. 425 (1926).
152
Dismuke v. United States, 297 U. S. 167, 56 S. Ct. 400 (1936); Lynch v.
United States, 292 U.S. 571, 54 S. Ct. 840 (1934); Tutun v. United States, 270
U. S. 568 at 577, 46 S. Ct. 425 (1926).
153
Justice Miller in Yankee Network, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm.,
(App. D. C. 1939) 107 F. (2d) 212 at 217, 218: "In the same manner as the rights
and equities of licensees are statutory in character so are their remedies. • • • To
contend that ••• administrative [and legal] remedy [remedies] provided under such
circumstance must be interpreted in terms of rights which might have been protected
in a court of law, would beg the question."
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electrical, economic, or otherwise-of an existing licensee was not an
appealable interest. The court held that
"to accept the argument of the Commission on this point would not
only leave the licensee without any opportunity for any relief
whatever, even from action so arbitrary as to destroy it, but would
deprive Section 402 (b) ( 2) of meaning and eliminate it from the
Act as effectively as if it were repealed."
The commission contended that the interpretation placed by the
Supreme Court upon the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission under the Transportation Act of 1920 to consider economic factors
cannot properly be applied by analogy to that portion of the Communications Act which deals with broadcasting. Justice Miller concluded
that the judicial interpretation of the Transportation Act was applicable to radio broadcasting.
"The powers of regulation possessed by the Federal Communications Commission over broadcasters are comprehensive and inclusive; and judicial review of its actions is highly important just as
it is in the case of the Interstate Commerce Commission."
The opinion further recites:
"In order to attain the purposes of the Act, the Commission
must assume the full responsibility cast upon it by Congress with
respect to each applicant and each protesting licensee. In order to
assure full assumption of that responsibility and full performance
of its duty, in situations such as exist in the present case, Congress
made the Commission's action subject to judicial review. In the
absence of such possibility of review the Commission-while
admitting its duty-could arbitrarily avoid it; thus indulging in
an abusive exercise of its administrative discretion." 154
The reluctance of the court to adopt the commission's arguments
must be attributed not only to the legal analysis of the commission's
contentions, but also to a judicial apprehension that the administrative
seeks to immunize itself from judicial review. The opinion suggests a
critical judicial attitude of the administrative process.
This judicial attitude is better exemplified by the Pottsville m and
lHYankee Network, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm., (App. D. C. 1939)
107 F. (2d) 212 at 219, 221-222, 223.
155 Pottsville Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., 69 App. D. C.
7, 98 F. (2d) 288 (1938), (App. D. C. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 36, reversed in (U. S.
1940) 60 S. Ct. 437.
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related <:ases. 158 The decisions of both the court of appeals and the
Supreme Court will be set out in extenso since they clearly illustrate
contrasting judicial attitudes.
The commission had denied the application of the Pottsville Broadcasting Company to construct a local daytime broadcasting station on
two grounds: first, the applicant was not financially qualified, and,
second, the principal stockholder, a non-resident of Pottsville, Pennsylvania, was not familiar with the needs of the listening audience in
that area. The lower court ruled as a matter of law that the applicant
was financially qualified. On the question of the propriety of confining grants of a local nature to local people, Justice Groner said that,
"the Commission has not given any indication of a fixed and
definite policy. If the contrary of this were true, we should be
slow to say that the establishment of such a policy would be either
arbitrary or capricious. But the policy should be applied with substantial uniformity and the lack of that uniformity convinces us
that the Commission has not s~mght to lay down a hard and fast
rule." 1s1
This statement by the court represents a marked departure from
its earlier philosophy. Whereas the Symons case 158 implies that each
decision should be decided on its individual merits, the Pottsville
opinion suggests that the commission curb its administrative discretion
by crystallizing policies and adhering to administratively defined
standards. The Pottsville case was remanded to the commission on the
sole ground that it reconsider and establish a definite policy on the
issue of confining local grants to local people. The lower court stated
that it had no intention of exercising supervisory control over questions
of policy, and that any uniformly applied policy would be acceptable.
Following this remand, Pottsville petitioned the commission to
grant its original application. This the commission refused, and set for
argument Pottsville's application along with two rival applications for
the same facility. The latter applications had been filed subsequently
to that of Pottsville and were still undisposed of when the Pottsville
case returned to the commission. The commission announced it woulq.
158 McNinch v. Heitmeyer, (App. D. C. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 41,reversed in
(U.S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 443, sub nom. Fly v. Heitmeyer; per curiamopinion in Courier
Post Publishing Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., (App. D. C.) dated June 30.
1939 and order dated August 2, 1939.
151 Pottsville Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., 69 App. D. C.
7at9-10, 98 F. (2d) 288 (1938).
158 Symons Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Radio Comm., 62 App. D. C. 46, 64
F. (2d) 381 (1933).
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consider the several applications "individually on a comparative basis,
the application which in the judgment of the Commission will best
serve public interest to be granted." 159 Pottsville applied to the court
of appeals for a writ of prohibition to enjoin the commission from exercising its powers except as required by the judgment of the court and
for a writ of mandamus to require the commission to reconsider
the application on the original record. The question before the
judicial tribunal was whether the commission, having decided that
the applicant was qualified in particular respects, might later disregard
petitioner's priority and the case made by it and consider its application
on a comparative basis with subsequent applications on records made
after the commission's original decision. The lower court ruled that an
appeal from the commission should have the same effect and be governed by the same rules as apply in appeals from a lower federal court
to an appellate federal court in an equity proceeding. The court in
remanding a case will determine whether the commission shall reconsider the case on the original record, remake the record on a showing
of newly discovered evidence, or permit a hearing de novo. Pottsville's
claim of priority and individual treatment of its application without
consideration of subsequently filed applications was based on paragraph
ro6.4 of the commission's regulations.100 The latter recognizes priority
159

Quoted in Pottsville Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm.,
(App. D. C. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 36 at 38.
160 "In fixing dates for hearing the Commission will, so far as is practicable,
endeavor to fix the same date for hearings on all related matters which involve the
same applicant or arise out of the same complaint or cause and for hearings on all
applications which by reason of the privileges, terms or conditions requested present
conflicting claims of the same nature excepting, however, applications filed after any
such application has been designated for hearing." In Colonial Broadcasters, Inc. v.
Federal Communications Comm., (App. D. C. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 781, the interpretation of the rule as applied in the Pottsville case was reapproved as consistent with the
provisions of the act because the regulation offered a fixed and easily applied standard
rather than one of unlimited discretion. Judicial formalization of ambiguous procedural rules into established administrative standards confirms the judicial trend which
suggests that the commission circumscribe its discretion by self-imposed administrative
limitations. For example, in Pottsville Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications
Comm., (App. D. C. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 36 at 40, the court said: "While it is
true the authority to grant is exclusive in the Commission, and while it is also true,
as we have said before, that the license conferred on the owner of a radio broadcasting
station is permissive only and within the power of the Commission by congressional
delegation, we cannot consent to the view that either the right to grant or the right
to revoke is subject to the uncontrolled discretion of that tribunal. In granting licenses
the Commission is required to act 'as public convenience, interest or necessity requires.'
This criterion is not to be interpreted as setting up a standard so indefinite as to confer
unlimited power.'' Federal Radio Comm. v. Nelson Brothers Bond & Mortgage Co.,
289 U. S. 266, 53 S. Ct. 627 (1933); Yankee Network Inc, v. Federal Communica-
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of filing when subsequent applications are made after the prior one
has been set for hearing. After pointing out that the petitioner should
not be put in any worse position than it occupied on the original hearing, the court went to the heart of the controversy and severely condemned the commission's conduct:
"But we think it is obvious that the particular objections of the
Commission to a reconsideration on the record-to which we have
referred-are mere makeweights, and that the real bone of contention is the insistence by the Commission upon absolute authority to decide the rights of applicants for permits without regard to
previous findings or decisions made by it or by this court." 101
The Supreme Court, per Justice Frankfurter, reversed the lower
tribunal. It held that the familiar doctrine, that the lower court is
bound to respect the mandate of an appellate court and cannot reconsider questions which the mandate has laid at rest, has no application
to administrative agencies. The latter, which differ in origin and function from the courts,162 and have been invested with powers not postions Comm., (App. D. C. 1939) 107 F. (2d) 212; Heitmeyer v. Federal Communications Comm., 68 App. D. C. 180, 95 F. (2d) 91 (1937).
161 Pottsville Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., (App. D. C.
1939) 105 F. (2d) 36 at 40. McNinch v. Heitmeyer, (App. D. C. 1939) 105 F.
(2d) 41, reversed (U. S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 443, sub nom. Fly v. Heitmeyer, represents
the aftermath of Heitmeyer v. Federal Communications Comm., 68 App. D. C. 180,
95 F. (2d) 91 (1937). Heitmeyer filed a bill of complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia asking that the commission be permanently
enjoined from granting any construction permit or license to any other applicant for
a radio station at Cheyenne, Wyoming, until after the commission had rendered a
decision on the record as made at the original hearing. Competing applications were
filed after the Heitmeyer application had been remanded to the commission by the
• court. The lower court ruled that mandamus or statutory appeal was the prope, remedy
and dismissed the bill without prejudice to the application by Heitmeyer to use
mandamus if such application were necessary to protect his rights. The Supreme Court
applied the principle established in the Pottsville case and reversed the lower court
by ordering the writ of mandamus dissolv~d. Courier Post Publishing Co. v. Federal
Communications Comm., (App. D. C.) per curiam opinion dated June 30, 1939, is
the aftermath of Courier Post Publishing Co. v. Federal Communications Comm.,
(App. D. C. 1939) 104 F. (2d) 213. The court in its per curiam opinion authorized
the hearing to be reopened only for the purpose of taking additional testimony on a
technical issue of interference. The opinions of the Supreme Court in the Pottsville and
Heitmeyer cases vacate the orders of the lower court and the cases will be remanded to
the commission for whatever action the latter deems appropriate.
162 Hanft, "Utilities Commissions as Expert Courts," 15 N. C. L. REv. 12 at 14
(1936), reprinted in 4 SELECTED EsSAYS ON CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 592 at 595
(1938): "There are, it is true, many differences between courts and administrative
commissions. Utilities commissions, for example, may initiate as well as try cases; may
gather as well as pass upon evidence. They have powers of continuous control over the
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sessed by the latter, cannot be assimilated into the judicial machinery
under Article III of the Constitution. Congress has entrusted to the
commission a legislative policy expressed by the standard of public
interest, convenience, or necessity. The latter can only be effectuated
by permitting the commission to establish its own procedure-whether
applications should be heard contemporaneously or successively,
whether parties should be allowed to intervene in one another's proceedings. The jurisdiction of the courts in reviewing an administrative
determination is confined to errors of law. On remand the commission
is bound to act upon the correction; but the remand does not preclude
the commission from adopting whatever procedure and taking such
further action as will be in accordance with the applicable law. The
contingencies of judicial review and of litigation cannot create rights
of priority in Pottsville as against later applicants.
"Only Congress could confer such a priority. It has not done so.
The Court of Appeals cannot write the principle into the statute as
an indirect result of its power to scrutinize legal errors in the first
of an allowable series of administrative actions." 168
The Pottsville opinions offer a study in what are almost antithetical
attitudes towards the commission. The Supreme Court for all practical
purposes has established the commission as an independent and autonomous agency subject to a minimum of judicial supervision. The effect
of this opinion may well be to nullify the lower court's efforts to compel the commission to enunciate definitive standards in the latter's
administration of the act. The court of appeals, on the other hand, has
sought to apply to the Communications Commission the principles
which control its jurisdiction over lower federal courts to the end that
administrative and judicial standards are reflected in the administrative
process. The opinion of the lower court suggests an intimate knowledge
of the commission's administrative machinery and practice. It must
be remembered that the Supreme Court has insulated itself from reviewing the administrative activities of the agency for seven years; the
lower court has had an unending stream of cases which have exposed
the administrative process in its entirety. The Supreme Court, in nulliutilities which occasionally appear as litigants before them, and they are thereby enabled
-to understand the litigation by reason of long familiarity with the problems out of
which it grew." See also Root, "Public Service by the Bar," 41 A. B. A. REP. 355
at 368-369 (1916).
168 Federal Communications Comm. v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., (U. S. 1940)
60 S. Ct. 437.
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fying the lower court's interpretation of rule I 06.4,164 relied on the commission's interpretation of the rule as set forth in the commission's
brief. 16 G But the administrative interpretation of a regulation is gleaned
not from a self-serving declaration in a brief but rather by the operation
of the administrative process where the rule has been applied. In at
least three cases the commission refused to consider competing applications after the prior applications had been designated for hearing. 166
Quoted at note 160, supra.
Commission's Brief in Federal Communications Comm. v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., pp. 47-48: "The Commission Rules of Practice provide that 'the Commission will, so far as practicable, endeavor to fix the same date • • . for hearings on all
applications which •.• present conflicting claims ••• excepting, however, applications
filed after any such application has been designated for hearing.' The excepting clause
in this rule of procedure seems to have been read by the court below as giving an
absolute ,right of priority of consideration to applicants whose applications have been
set for hearing before other applications are filed. But the rule, as the commission urged
in the court below and has consistently interpreted it, merely provides, in the interest
of avoiding undue delay, that a newly filed application will not ordinarily be set for
hearing on the same date as those already set for hearing, and has no bearing upon the
order in which applications will finally be acted upon by the commission."
166 Re Wichita Cases (West Texas Broadcasting Company et al.), Dockets Nos.
4218, 4354, 4356, 4355, decided February 20, 1939: "The Wichita Broadcasting
Company filed an application on October 19, 1936 for construction permit to establish
a new radiobroadcast station at Wichita Falls, Texas, to operate on 620 kilocycles, with
power of 250 watts night, one kilowatt local sunset, unlimited time. This application was
designated for hearing on December 8, 1936, and was heard (together with several other
applications for facilities at Wichita Falls) on February IO to 13, and March 29 and
30, 1937. On May 26, 1937 the examiner submitted his report (I-435).
"On March 15, 1937, Station KTBS filed an application for the use of the
same frequency at Shreveport, Louisiana. That application was designated for hearing
on April 2, 1937, and was dismissed on May 25, 1937, at the request of the applicant.
The second application for the use of the same frequency at Shreveport, Louisiana,
was filed by Station KTBS on June 2, 1937. This application was designated for
hearing on August 18, 1937.
"In the Commission's 'Statement of Facts, Grounds for Decision, and Order'
granting the Wichita Broadcasting Company's application, it was noted that the
application of Station KTBS has been withdrawn. At that time, and now, the records
of the commission show such to be a fact. In its Motion for Rehearing, Station KTBS
charges that there could be no testimony in the record concerning the withdrawal of
its first application, which was dismissed May 25, 1937, after hearing was closed, and
contends that the Commission would not have granted the Wichita application had
it taken notice of the pendency of a later application filed by it.
"The contentions of Station KTBS are not persuasive. The facts disclose that
when the hearing on the Wichita case commenced (February IO, 1937) there was no
application pending on behalf of Station KTBS. Its first application was filed on May
·15, 1937, and as that application was not on file when the Wichita Broadcasting Company's application was set for hearing, the application of Station KTBS was not
entitled to be heard simultaneously. See Rule 106.4 of the Commission relating to
164
165
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This had the practical effect of creating a right of priority in the first
applicant which precluded the grant of the second application for the
same facilities. And in one decision the commission, among other
grounds, recognized priority of filing where competing applications
were involved. 101 The lower court's interpretation of rule ro6.4 would
appear to harmonize with actual administrative practice, which has in
effect established a right of priority.
From the broad perspective of administrative law it is unquestionably true that the extent of judic~al control derived from the interrelationship of appellate to trial courts has not been applied in toto to
govern the relationship of courts to administrative agencies.168 Historically and functionally, commissions differ from courts; but from
a practical point of view they exercise judicial functions affecting the
applications for conflicting facilities; and see Pulitzer Publishing Company v. Federal
Communications Commission [68 App. D. C. 124, 94 F. (2d) 249 (1937)].
"The last application of Station KTBS was filed after the hearing and the proceeding under consideration was closed." ·
Compare the facts in the Wichita cases with the Heitmeyer case. In the latter
case, applications for the same facility requested by Heitmeyer were filed after the
Heitmeyer case had been remanded to the commission by the lower court. To the same
effect are Re Standard Life Insurance of the South, 5 F. C. C. 349 at 350 (1938),
and Re Lucas, 5 F. C. C. 464 at 466 (1938), affirmed in Colonial Broadcasters, Inc.
v. Federal Communications Comm., (App. D. C. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 781.
167 Re Stevens and Stevens, 5 F. C. C. 177 at 182 (1938): "Moreover, even if all
other facts and circumstances were equal (and they are not}, the Port Huron Broadcasting Company application was filed more than a year prior to the application of
Willim W. Ottaway and the granting therefore of the Port Huron Broadcasting Company reaches a more equitable result." The public notice in the commission's proposed
decision in Re Barnes and Weiland tr/as Martinsville Broadcasting Co. (Mimeograph
No. 38477, published on January II, 1940) is extremely significant. The public
notice of a proposed decision is a press release which quotes verbatim from the conclusions of a proposed decision. The press release recites: "Having fully considered all
relevant and material facts and circumstances in the record in each case, the Commission
concludes, and so finds that public interest, convenience and necessity will be better
served by the granting of the application of the Martinsville Broadcasting Company,
by reason of the priority of the filing of the original applicant, and further on the
grounds that both William C. Barnes and Jonas Weiland have had considerable experience in the operation of broadcasting stations, whereas none of the partners in the
application filed by the Patrick Henry Broadcasting Company have had any experience
whatsoever in the operation of broadcasting stations." The proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of the commission (Dockets Nos. 5425, 5497, release.d on January
12, 1940) do not refer to the priority of the Martinsville Broadcasting Company
as one of the grounds for preferring that applicant.
168 Compare Ford Motor Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S.
364, 59 S. Ct. 301 (1939); United States v. Morgan, 307 U. S. 183, 59 S. Ct.
795 ( 1939).

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 38

rights of litigants to the same extent ~ the adjudications of courts.100
A pragmatic approach to this problem suggests that administrative
agencies be recognized as courts and placed under the judicial super.vision of the appellate courts to the same extent as lower federal courts.
The effect of the Pottsville opinion would appear to establish administrative agencies in the long run as independent and autonomous systems of administrative courts. 110 This approach may be attributed in
part to the desire of the Supreme Court to establish habits of responsibility in administrative agencies. 11~ This will ameliorate the conflict
between law and administration, but at the expense of the law. 172
The Courier Post Publishing Company case 173 merits discussion
because the opinion contains language which appears to deviate from
principles established in previous cases. The commission had denied
appellant's application to construct a new broadcasting station in Hannibal, Missouri, on the ground that there was no public need for broadcasting facilities. The court, per Justice Vinson, carefully examined the
record and ruled that the evidence contradicted the foregoing conclusion and that there was a public need for a local station in Hannibal.
The opinion went one step further by including therein detailed findings of fact to show the public need for broadcasting facilities. 174
The commission in its brief contended that there was no demand
by local merchants which would insure the commercial operation of the
station. Justice Vinson responded by referring to statistical data in the
commission's decision which disclosed that three hundred thirty-three
retail merchants and sixty-three factories were potential customers
169 Compare Pillsbury, "Administrative Tribunals," 36 HARV. L. REv. 405,
583 (1923), first part reprinted in 4 SELECTED EssAYS ON CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW
367 (1938); Brown, "Administrative Commissions and the Judicial Power," 19
MINN. L. REv. 261 (1935), reprinted in 4 SELECTED EssAYs ON CoNsTITUTIONAL
LAw 384 (1938).
170 Hanft, "Utilities Commissions or Expert Courts," 15 N. C. L. REv. 12
(1936), reprinted in 4 SELECTED EssAYs ON CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 592 (1938);
Rosenberry, "Powers of the Courts to Set Aside Administrative Rules and Orders,"
24 A. B. A. J. 279, 333 (1938); Cooper, "The Proposed United States Administrative
Court," 35 M1cH. L. REV. 193 (1936), 565 (1937); Fuchs, "Concepts and Policies
in Anglo-American Administrative Law Theory," 47 YALE L. J. 538 (1938).
171 Justice Brandeis in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S.
38 at 92, 56 S. Ct. 720 ( 1936): "Responsibility is the great developer of men." See
also LASKI, AUTHORITY IN THE MoDERN STATE 91 (1919).
172 United States v. Morgan, 307 U. S. 183 at 191, 59 S. Ct. 795 (1939).
173 Courier Post Publishing Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., (App. D. C.
1939) 104 F. (2d) 213.
lM But cf. Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., 68 App.
D. C. 282 at 291, 96 F. (2d) 554 (1938).
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and supporters of the proposed station. He further stated, "Uncontradicted testimony is that more than thirty business enterprises have been
personally contacted by the manager of the proposed station and this
number has promised to use the new facilities. • . ." m The action of
the court in making the foregoing findings appears to be in conflict
with the Tri-State decision,176 wherein Justice Stephens excluded similar testimony because it was hearsay. In the latter case, one Roderick:,
over the objection of appellant, reported the results of his conversations with various people. "Those I talked to were unanimously of the
opinion that another station would be very beneficial, and the majority
of them promised financial support to it." The court ruled that the
admission of this testimony "deprived appellant of the right to crossexamine those a composite of whose views Roderick was reflecting in
the record." 177 The Courier case may be distinguished on the ground
that no party to the proceeding objected to the introduction of this
hearsay testimony.
The Courier Post Publishing Company had assigned as error the
failure of the commission to apply the same standards adopted in similar cases wherein comparable or smaller communities had been granted
local stations. Justice Vinson declared that these cases show that the
commission had established a definite policy of granting permits for
local stations to communities served with clear channel and regional
stations but having no local station. The court was unable to subscribe
to appellant's theory that previously decided cases control the action
of the commission, since it is difficult to find cases that square on the
facts.
"In administering the law, the Commission must consider each case
on its individual grounds. The permit should be granted if it
meets the statutory criterion of public convenience, interest or
necessity, if not, it should be denied. In the instant case, it seems
to us there has been a departure from the policy of the Commission
expressed in the decided cases, but this is not a controlling factor
upon the Commission." 178
This language appears inconsistent with the pronouncements of the
court in the Pottsville and related cases wherein the commission was
175 Courier Post Pub. Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., (App. D. C.
1939) 104 F. (2d) 213 at 218.
170
Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., 68 App. D. C.
292, 96 F. (2d) 564 (1938).
177
Ibid., 68 App. D. C. at 294, 295.
178
Courier Post Publishing Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., (App. D. C.
1939) 104 F. (2d) 213 at 218.
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required to formulate and adhere to administratively defined standards.
The questI~m raised by the commission's use of confidential memoranda submitted by its staff dehors the record in arriving at its decision was in issue in the Sanders case.179 The commission specifically
denied this allegation. The court applied the presumption of regularity
of official conduct, but warned the commission that "the necessity of
administrative efficiency cannot excuse the use of star chamber procedures to -deprive a citizen of a fair hearing." Two opinions have
admonished the commission to give greater attention to the reports
of its examiners.180 The court in several cases has suggested that broadcast stations represent large investments of capital which serve as the
basis for large commercial enterprises and that existing arrangements
of broadcast facilities be not disturbed without reason. 181
From the fall of 1937 to October r, 1939, the court handed down
twenty-three written opinions. Fourteen opinions upheld the commission's action by either affirming the administrative decision or dismissing the appeal because the court lacked jurisdiction; nine cases were
reversed and remanded to the lower tribunal. In the main, the court's
activities have been directed in three channels. First, the court has
spelled out the administrative procedure which must be followed before
appellate jurisdiction can be invoked. Second, the procedural and substantive provisions of section 402 have been clarified to some extent.
Third, the court has suggested improvements in the administrative
process, in particular adequate and detailed findings of fact and crystallization of administrative policies and standards. But in no sense caµ
it be said that the court in exercising its supervisory powers has invaded the administrative functions of the commission. The appellate
tribunal acknowledges its deference to the technical and skilled competence of the commission; administrative finality attaches to factual
findings on technical issues.182 The court has been extremely careful
not to superimpose its views and direct administrative policies.
179 Sanders Brothers Radio Station v. Federal Communications Comm., 70 App.
D. C. 265, 106 F. (2d) 321 at 326 (1939), cert. granted (U. S. 1939) 60 S.
Ct. 294.
180 Heitmeyer v. Federal Communications Comm., 68 App. D. C. 180, 95 F.
(2d) 91 (1937); Courier Post Publishing Co. v. Federal Communications Comm.,
(App. D. C. 1939) 104 F. (2d) 213.
181 Yankee Network, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm., (App. D. C. 1939)
I07 F. (2d) 212; Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. Federal Communications Comm.,
(App. D. C. 1939) rn5 F. (2d) 793.
182 Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc. v. Federal Communications Comm.,
(App. D. C. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 75; Ward v. Federal Communications Comm., (App.
D. C. 1939) 108 F. (2d) 486.
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The factors which have prompted the court to change its judicial
attitude have been previously set forth. Decisions, such as the Heitmeyer, Pottsville, and Yankee cases, clearly reflect a skeptical approach
toward the activities of the commission. Perhaps this new judicial
attitude may be attributed in part to the rapid change in personnel of
the Federal Communications Commission.183 Some of the new appointees lack the technical background and experience of their predecessors.184 But there can be no doubt that this changed judicial attitude
reflects to some extent a judicial disapproval of the commission's administrative process.
The conclusion is warranted that the appellate tribunal gave the
commission a wide latitude in the early administration of communications and exercised restricted judicial supervision. Since the fall of
1937 there has been a decided change in the judicial attitude. The
failure of the Communications Commission to crystallize policies and
establish definite standards in its administrative interpretation of the
yardstick of public interest, convenience, or necessity, and haphazard
and inaccurate findings of fact have resulted in a lack of public respect
for the agency. This has produced the changed judicial attitude and
contributed to a broader judicial supervision.
This extension of the supervisory powers of the court has resulted
in several reforms in the administrative process.185 The commission's
decisions are clearer and more concise. The basic facts are spelled out
and differentiated from conclusions of law. Whereas at one time two,
and at the most three, commissioners handled all broadcast matters,
the administrative machinery has been reorganized, and now all seven
commissioners participate in broadcast matters.186 The procedure has
been streamlined. The examiner's staff has been abolished and the
183 Four of the seven commissioners appointed when the Federal Communications
Commission was established in 1934 are active as commissioners. The commission has
had four different chairmen since its inception. 1 F. C. C. ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1935);
5 ibid. II (1939).
184 HERRING, FEDERAL COMMISSIONERS 121-122 (1936). A notable exception is
Commissioner T. A. M. Craven appointed July 1, 1937. Commissioner Craven was,
prior to his appointment, chief engineer of the commission and is an outstanding expert
in the field of communications.
185 The appointment of Frank R. McNinch as chairman of the commission on
October 1, 1937, and William J. Dempsey as general counsel on December 16, 1938,
are highly significant. Both gentleman instituted changes in the administrative machinery and procedure of the co~ission. Several of the changes preceded the increased
activity of the court.
186 Commission Order No. 20, 4 F. C. C. 41 (1937).
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commission, in lieu of examiner's reports, issues proposed decisions. 187
Parties may file exceptions to proposed decisions and obtain oral argument before the commission. In the long run this new procedure will
unquestionably accelerate the speed of the administrative process, but
it is believed that this increased efficiency has removed the safeguard
of personal responsibility which attached to reports issued by examiners.
The latter were disassociated from the commission's law department,
heard the witnesses and submitted reports under their own names.
Under the new procedure the examiner's division has been integrated
into the law department; there is no clear-cut division between prosecuting and judicial functions, and it is quite probable that proposed
decisions are prepared by attorneys who have not participated in the
hearing. At the present time it is impossible to determine whether the
commission has crystallized policies in its administrative interpretation
of the act. There is an imperative need for a thorough investigation
and analysis of the commission's administrative process as reflected in
its decisions. A cursory examination of the decisions indicates that the
commission is still floundering around in the turbulent seas of policymaking and experimentation with various administrative policies.188
The reluctance to crystallize policies and adhere to administratively
defined standards may be attributed in part to the promulgation of new
engineering standards.189
Such has been the effect of the court's increased judicial supervision
on the commission's administrative practice. Perhaps the court may
in the future change its judicial attitude and give thorough approval
to the administrative process. The latter can be accomplished only if
the commission develops a reputation for fairness and thoroughness.
This is the commission's task.
C. C.,
3347 (1939).
187 F.

RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,

§ 1.231(£), 4

FED, REG.

188 The writer expects to publish at some time in the near future an extended
article on the commission's administrative process as exemplified by its decisions.
189 F. C. C., STANDARDS OF Goon ENGINEERING PRACTICE, effective August I,
1939, 4 FED. REG. 2862 (1939).

